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From the early days of the Internet, commentators have warned that 
it would be impossible for those who act on the Internet (“Internet ac-
tors”) to comply with the copyright laws of all Internet-connected coun-
tries if the national copyright laws of all those countries were to apply 
simultaneously to Internet activity. A multiplicity of applicable copyright 
laws seems plausible at least when the Internet activity is ubiquitous—
i.e., unrestricted by geoblocking or by other means—given the territorial-
ity principle that governs international copyright law and either the lex 
loci delicti or lex loci protectionis choice-of-law rules that countries 
typically use for copyright infringements. 
Commentators have advanced various proposals to eliminate this 
multiplicity of applicable national copyright laws. Some experts have 
called for a new and universal legal regime to govern the Internet that 
would be distinct from the legal regimes of individual countries; this pro-
posal would result in a single global copyright law that would govern all 
Internet actors without regard to any particular national copyright laws. 
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Other experts have suggested that the multiplicity be addressed by unify-
ing national copyright laws and making the laws identical or almost 
identical; this suggestion is another way to make a single set of copyright 
law standards apply globally. Experts working at the intersection of in-
tellectual property law and conflict of laws have proposed conflict-of-laws 
solutions to simplify the enforcement of copyright on the Internet; their 
solutions would not eliminate the differences among national copyright 
laws but would limit the number of national copyright laws that would 
apply to acts on the Internet in any given scenario. 
This Article posits that the multiplicity of applicable national copy-
right laws on the Internet is not as significant a problem for law-abiding 
Internet actors as some commentators fear. What makes the multiplicity 
workable for Internet actors are the realities—or inefficiencies—of cross-
border copyright enforcement that de facto limit the number of potential-
ly applicable national copyright laws. This Article reviews the solutions 
that have been proposed to address the multiplicity problem and ex-
amines the objections to the proposals that have already been or could be 
raised. The Article then analyzes the current realities of copyright en-
forcement on the Internet and contrasts the realities with the anticipated 
workings of the proposed solutions. 
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From the beginnings of the Internet1 a number of commenta-
tors have warned that Internet actors—Internet service providers, 
website operators, content providers, and Internet users—cannot 
comply with copyright law on the global digital network (or can 
comply only with exorbitant costs) because of the large number of 
countries’ copyright laws (“multiple copyright laws”) that apply to 
the actors’ Internet activities.2 The multiplicity of potentially ap-
plicable national copyright laws (the “multiplicity problem”) is 
caused by the nature of copyright as an intangible right created by 
national laws and by the rules for choice of law applicable to copy-
right infringements and to other copyright-related acts and occur-
rences. 
To determine which country’s copyright law applies, national 
courts typically use (for infringements and often also for other cop-
yright-related acts and occurrences)3 the choice-of-law rule that 
points to the law of the place of the tortious activity (lex loci delicti, 
lex loci protectionis).4 Unless Internet activities are limited geograph-
                                                                                                                            
1 The term “Internet” is used throughout this Article as a generic term for any type of 
electronic communication, even if it is not based on the Internet protocol. For a 
discussion of the current use of the term, see Marketa Trimble, The Future of Cybertravel: 
Legal Implications of the Evasion of Geolocation, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 567, 575 n.25 (2012). 
2 See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should 
Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 480–81 (2000); Andreas P. Reindl, Choosing 
Law in Cyberspace: Copyright Conflicts on Global Networks, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 799, 807–
08 (1998) (discussing how different national copyright laws govern a work which has been 
unlawfully reproduced in one country and made available to the public in another). 
3 See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Developing A Private International Intellectual 
Property Law: The Demise of Territoriality, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 711, 729–33 (2009) 
(reviewing the scope of application of the lex loci protectionis rule). 
4 Most countries apply these rules to copyright infringement; countries’ rules for 
choice of law applicable to other copyright-related acts and occurrences vary. Some 
countries apply the rule of the law of the protecting country (lex loci protectionis), meaning 
the law of the country whose law provides copyright protection to the work at issue and in 
which copyright was infringed. Whether the Berne Convention mandates the rule or not 
has been disputed. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Global Use/Territorial Rights: Private 
International Law Questions of the Global Information Infrastructure, 42 J. COPYRIGHT 
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ically through geoblocking5 or some form of censorship that dis-
ables access to content on the Internet,6 the effects of the activities 
extend to all countries connected to the Internet (those countries 
where the results of the activities can be viewed, downloaded, or 
streamed) where—at least in theory—the activities cause each of 
the countries to be a place of tortious activity, thereby subjecting 
Internet actors to the copyright laws of each of the countries.7 
The multiplicity of national copyright laws is problematic be-
cause countries’ copyright laws continue to differ despite a signifi-
cant degree of harmonization of national copyright laws in the past 
                                                                                                                            
SOC’Y U.S.A. 318, 336–37 (1995) [hereinafter Global Use/Territorial Rights] (noting that 
the language “where protection is sought” in Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention may 
not necessarily refer to the law of where the infringement occurred, but rather to the law 
of the forum country, i.e., lex fori); 2 SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, 
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND 
BEYOND § 20.01 (2d ed. 2005) (“[D]eriving from the Berne text supranational choice of 
law rules is a delicate, if not improbable, operation.”); PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BERNT 
HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE 129 (2010) 
(arguing that Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention is not a choice of law provision but is 
“essentially no more than a rule barring discrimination against foreign right holders, 
which requires a country to apply the same law to works of foreign origin as it applies to 
works of its own nationals”). 
5 See Trimble, supra note 1, at 587–90. 
6 See, e.g., Evgeny Mozorov, Egypt Action May Spread Internet Kill Switch Idea, S.F. 
GATE, (Feb. 6, 2011), http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/Egypt-action-may-spread-
Internet-kill-switch-idea-3243860.php; Christopher Beam, Egypt Protest Internet Shut Off: 
How did the Egyptian government turn off the Internet?, SLATE (Jan. 28, 2011, 4:55 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/id/2283000/; James Crowie, Egypt Leaves the Internet, DYN 
RESEARCH BLOG (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.renesys.com/blog/2011/01/egypt-leaves-
the-internet.shtml. 
7 See, e.g., Global Use/Territorial Rights, supra note 4, at 322 (concluding that effective 
judicial deterrence of piracy requires that intellectual property rights holders be able to 
sue infringers in every country that infringing material may be received); Graeme W. 
Austin, Social Policy Choices and Choice of Law for Copyright Infringement in Cyberspace, 79 
OR. L. REV. 575, 588 (2000) (observing that applying lex loci in the digital world involves 
the challenges of applying multiple copyright laws). This approach to choice of law is also 
known as the “mosaic approach” and is consistent with the “Bogsch Theory,” named 
after Arpad Bogsch, a WIPO Director, who advanced the proposition that “any utilisation 
of a protected work that is relevant from the viewpoint of copyright takes place where the 
work—through copies, through performance, or through any kind of communication 
technique—is actually made available to the public.” Mihály Ficsor, Direct Broadcasting 
by Satellite and the ‘Bogsch Theory’, 18 INT’L BUS. LAW. 258, 258 (1990). See also RITA 
MATULIONYTĖ, LAW APPLICABLE TO COPYRIGHT: A COMPARISON OF THE ALI AND CLIP 
PROPOSALS 126–29 (Edward Elgar 2011); JOSEF DREXL, INTERNATIONALES IMMATERIAL-
GÜTERRECHT, IN MÜNCHNER KOMMENTAR ZUM BGB 251–58 (5th ed. 2010). 
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130 years.8 Copyright practice itself does mitigate some of the con-
tinuing national copyright law differences when persons or entities 
pursue multinational and comprehensive copyright strategies in 
countries with different laws;9 however, the differences among 
laws complicate cross-border activities involving copyrighted 
works,10 particularly when less sophisticated persons or entities are 
involved who cannot navigate the differences as effectively (or na-
vigate them at all) as more experienced persons or entities can. 
In the offline world it seems more likely that parties will realize 
that the copyright laws of multiple countries may govern their ac-
tivities; for example, a book publisher is likely to recognize the pos-
sibility that multiple copyright laws will be applicable when the 
publisher ships physical books to and sells them in a foreign coun-
try. However, many Internet actors seem oblivious to the possibili-
ty that their Internet acts may subject them to a foreign country’s 
laws; the actors might see their online activity, such as posting a 
photograph on a website, as an activity that occurs in a single coun-
try—that country being where they are located when they post the 
                                                                                                                            
8 In the past 130 years, countries have concluded international treaties to harmonize 
national copyright laws; however, the treaties include various flexibilities that allow 
countries to maintain differences in their national laws. E.g., Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1896, 11850 U.N.T.S. 223 (1986) 
[hereinafter Berne Convention] (as revised at Paris July 4, 1971 and amended Sept. 28, 
1979); Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, April 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 
154 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]; WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, WCT, S. 
TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17. For an overview of flexibilities—both those intentionally 
introduced in the treaties by treaty negotiators and those unintentionally persisting see, 
for example, Marketa Trimble, Advancing National Intellectual Property Policies in a 
Transnational Context, 74 MD. L. REV. 203 (2015). 
9 For example, countries may agree that employers should be able to exercise 
economic rights to works that their employees create in the course of employment. The 
United States has a work-for-hire doctrine that achieves this result by vesting copyright to 
the employee’s work in the employer; other countries with no work-for-hire doctrine 
allow for copyright to employee-created works to be subject to an exclusive license that is 
either granted in an employment contract or created by law. Compare 17 U.S.C. §201(b) 
(2012) with Zhongua Renmin Gonghe Guo Zhuzuo Quan Fa [Copyright Law of the 
People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 7, 1990, 
amended Feb. 26, 2010 by the Standing Comm of the Nat’l People’s Cong., amendments 
effective Apr. 1, 2010) art. 16, available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_
id=186569, and CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE art. L113-9 (Fr.). 
10 See discussion supra Introduction; see also Global Use/Territorial Rights, supra note 4, 
at 323–30; Austin, supra note 7, at 603–10. 
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photograph. Alternatively, some Internet actors may mistakenly 
believe that only the country of their domicile may legitimately re-
gulate their conduct,11 or that because their acts occur on the Inter-
net no country will or may regulate their conduct.12 
Because the Internet makes it extremely easy to engage in 
cross-border activities, it enables all Internet actors to engage in 
such activities, and even actors who are not versed in the intrica-
cies of international copyright are exposed to cross-border dealings 
involving copyright issues. While offline cross-border activities 
concerning copyrighted works13 have often been performed by so-
phisticated repeat players such as publishing houses, motion pic-
ture studios, and press agencies, online activities involving cross-
border copyright issues concern Internet actors with varying levels 
of awareness of, or possibly no awareness of, or experience with, 
foreign copyright laws that might apply to their activities.14 The 
multiplicity problem is exacerbated in the online world because the 
number of countries’ laws implicated will typically be much higher 
than in the offline world.15 
Differences among countries’ copyright laws impact copyright 
issues such as protectable subject matter, initial copyright owner-
ship, licensing and assignments, rights, and exceptions and limita-
tions to the rights. Internet actors are able to mitigate some of the 
differences by identifying copyright owners and obtaining any ne-
cessary consent or licenses from them; however, transaction costs 
may be high, and may even exceed the costs of assuming the risk of 
copyright litigation when the Internet actors do not clear copyright 
                                                                                                                            
11 Although in many instances Internet actors may be subject to the law of only a single 
country, and that country may be the country of their domicile (place of residence, place 
of incorporation, or principal place of business), it is possible that in other instances 
actors may also be subject to the laws of other countries. 
12 See infra Part III.A (discussing the unawareness of many Internet actors with respect 
to the cross-border implications of their conduct). 
13 In this context, cross-border activities concerning copyrighted works do not include 
de minimis importation for non-commercial purposes. 
14 This Article leaves aside any discussion of whether the Internet is encouraging 
copyright-infringing behavior because of the anonymity it provides and the 
misconceptions it creates (e.g., perceptions that it is always legal to view, download, or 
stream any content that is available for free online). 
15 Dinwoodie, supra note 2, at 541 (“The problems of cyberspace bring [conflict-of-
laws] questions into sharper focus, and it is there that they appear most acute.”). 
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beforehand. Differences among national copyright laws complicate 
the identification of initial and subsequent copyright owners; the 
differences also make it difficult to determine where particular 
rights arise and where national laws carve out exceptions and limi-
tations that allow for use of copyrighted works without permission 
or a license in a particular situation. The following two examples 
illustrate the complexities of cross-border activities involving copy-
righted works. 
The first example concerns rules for initial copyright owner-
ship; the rules vary among countries, and one who is the owner of a 
copyright to a work in one country might not be the owner of the 
copyright to the same work in another country (under the latter 
country’s law).16 Assume, for example, that a photographer em-
ployed by an advertising agency in the United States takes a photo-
graph within the scope of his employment. Under the work made 
for hire doctrine applicable in the United States, the agency is the 
initial owner of copyright to the photograph.17 Germany, however, 
has no work for hire doctrine;18 in Germany the initial copyright 
ownership vests in the author, which in this example is the photo-
grapher who, absent his consent or a license he has granted, holds 
the exclusive rights that attach to the copyright.19 If the agency in-
tends to use the photograph on a website, it does not need consent 
or a license from the photographer to do so in the United States, 
but it will need his consent or license for other countries, such as 
Germany, where the website is accessible and where the photo-
                                                                                                                            
16 Some countries apply the law of the country of origin to the issue of initial copyright 
ownership with the result that the copyright has the same initial copyright owner in these 
countries as it has in the country of origin (provided that the law of the country of origin is 
interpreted and applied in the same manner in these countries). See, e.g., Código Civil 
Português, [C.Civ], Decreto-Lei n.º 47344/66 art. 48 (Port.). 
17 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012). 
18 Although no work for hire doctrine exists in Germany, an employer is entitled by law 
to exercise economic rights to a computer program that was “created by an employee in 
the performance of his duties or based on instructions from his employer.” 
URHEBERRECHTSGESETZ [UrhG] [COPYRIGHT LAW], Sept. 9, 1965, BUNDESGESETZBLATT 
[BGBL.] art. 69b(1) (Ger.). This provision is consistent with Directive 2009/24 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the Legal Protection of 
Computer Programs, 2009 O.J. (L 111) 16, art. 2(3). 
19 German courts will apply German law to determine who the copyright owner is in 
this case because German courts apply the law of the country where protection is sought 
to copyright ownership. 
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grapher—and not the agency—owns the copyright to the photo-
graph.20 
The second example of differences in national copyright laws 
concerns exceptions and limitations to copyright, which also vary 
among countries; acts that may be performed in one country with-
out permission or a license may require permission or a license in 
another country.21 For example, one of the enumerated exceptions 
under the German copyright statute allows the taking and posting 
on the Internet (i.e., the acts of reproduction, distribution, and 
making available to the public) of a photograph of a publicly access-
ible sculpture;22 there is a similar enumerated exception in the US 
Copyright Act, but the US exception does not cover the acts when 
they concern a stand-alone sculptural work (a sculpture that is not 
embodied in an architectural work).23 This difference in national 
laws means that the posting on the Internet of a photograph of a 
publicly accessible stand-alone sculpture without permission or a 
license will not infringe the copyright to the sculpture under Ger-
man copyright law; however, in the United States the posting (the 
public display) of the photograph on the Internet may infringe the 
copyright to the sculpture under US copyright law (although the 
                                                                                                                            
20 If the facts are reversed (if the agency and the photographer were domiciled in 
Germany), the different scenario would not necessarily create a problem; employment 
contracts in civil law countries often provide for an exclusive permanent license in favor 
of the employer. Additionally, US courts could decide to apply German law to assess the 
ownership of copyright to the photograph if the photographer is a German resident, his 
employer is a German entity, and the work was performed in Germany. See Itar-Tass 
Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[T]he law 
of the country with the closest relationship to the work will apply to settle the ownership 
dispute.”). Cf. Paul Edward Geller, Conflict of Laws in Copyright Cases: Infringement and 
Ownership Issues, 51 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 315, 327 (2004) (criticizing the choice of 
law analysis for copyright ownership in Itar-Tass and arguing that the Berne Convention 
implies a conflict of law rule). But see Global Use/Territorial Rights, supra note 4, at 331 
(“Apart from the article specifically addressing the law applicable to determine 
ownership of copyright in cinematographic works, the Berne Convention proffers no 
general choice of law rule for copyright ownership.”); William Patry, Choice of Law and 
International Copyright, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 383, 409 (2000) (arguing that “there is no 
Berne Convention requirement to apply national treatment to ownership of copyright”). 
21 E.g., Martin Senftleben, Breathing Space for Cloud-Based Business Models–Exploring 
the Matrix of Copyright Limitations, Safe Harbours and Injunctions, 4 JIPITEC 87, 91 
(2013). 
22 URHEBERRECHTSGESETZ of September 9, 1965, as last amended, art. 59(1). 
23 17 U.S.C. § 120(a) (2012). 
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fair use doctrine under US law24 might provide a successful de-
fense in some cases).25 
Commentators have asserted that the multiplicity problem is a 
major hurdle for the Internet and have developed solutions that 
address the problem by providing for a single copyright law to ap-
ply to Internet activities.26 Two types of solutions seek to limit the 
number of applicable copyright laws, but they employ different 
means to achieve the goal.27 The first type of solution calls for the 
creation of a single set of global copyright law standards that would 
apply on the Internet globally; the set of standards could be intro-
duced either as an extranational Internet-specific copyright law 
(that would be either legislated or developed judicially) or as a uni-
form copyright law implemented through national legislations.28 
The second type of solution aims to narrow the number of applica-
ble copyright laws by utilizing special conflict-of-laws rules—rules 
for choice of applicable law, personal jurisdiction, and the recogni-
tion and enforcement of foreign judgments; the special rules would 
operate together to achieve a result in which only a single country’s 
law (or the laws of a limited number of countries) applies (or apply) 
to an Internet activity in any given case.29 So far the two types of 
proposed solutions have gained little or no support from national 
governments at the national and international levels,30 and the 
                                                                                                                            
24 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
25 Theoretically, a US court could decide in this scenario to apply German law to the 
acts of alleged infringement if the court found that German law had the most significant 
relationship to the acts and the parties. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF 
LAWS § 145 (1971); Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 
91 (2d Cir. 1998). 
26 Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Use and Excuse on the Internet, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & 
ARTS 1, 44 (2000) (“Ideally, a choice of law rule that designated the law of a single 
country to govern the ensemble of Internet copyright transactions would considerably 
simplify the legal landscape, and thus promote Internet commerce.”). 
27 See, e.g., Andrea Antonelli, Applicable Law Aspects of Copyright Infringement on the 
Internet: What Principles Should Apply?, 2003 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 147 (2003). 
28 See infra Part I. 
29 See infra Part II. 
30 Some courts have referred to the proposals for special conflict-of-laws rules. See, e.g., 
Rundquist v. Vapiano, 798 F. Supp. 2d 102, 132 (D.D.C. 2011); Lucasfilm Ltd. v. 
Ainsworth, [2011] UKSC 39, ¶¶ 93–94; Case C-145/10, Painer v. Standard Verlags, 2011 
ECR I-12533, n.31; Case C-616/10, Solvay v. Honeywell, 2012 ECR. 193 , n.24 (opinion of 
AG Villalón); Case C-170/12, Pinckney v. KDG Mediatech AG, 2013 ECR, (opinion of 
AG Jääskinen). 
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specter of a multiplicity of applicable national copyright laws con-
tinues to loom over the Internet, at least in theory. 
In practice, various limitations on copyright enforcement re-
duce the number of copyright laws that will apply to a particular 
activity on the Internet. This Article argues that these limitations 
fashion a system in which actors who wish to comply with copy-
right laws face fewer challenges on the Internet than critics who 
perceive a multiplicity problem seem to assume. Some of these li-
mitations arise because of countries’ limited abilities to enforce 
their laws; as Jack Goldsmith noted in 1998 during the early years 
of the commercial Internet, “the skeptics [have] exaggerate[d] the 
threat of multiple regulation of cyberspace information flows” be-
cause “[t]his threat must be measured by a regulation’s enforcea-
ble scope.”31 Additional limitations come from the practicalities of 
litigation, when copyright owners must decide which country’s or 
countries’ laws they can and want to rely on when they enforce 
their rights. 
Although litigation represents only a small percentage of the 
enforcement actions that copyright owners employ (only a small 
percentage of copyright disputes result in court proceedings and 
enforcements of final judgments), the availability and course of liti-
gation impacts all other enforcement actions. Often the steps that 
precede litigation will suffice to enforce copyright, and third parties 
such as advertisers and payment processors may assist in extra-
judicial enforcement, although Internet actor behavior and copy-
right owner negotiating positions will ultimately be affected by the 
actual ability of copyright owners to effectively enforce their copy-
rights (i.e. whether copyright laws can and will actually be en-
forced).32 Given the global nature of most Internet actions and the 
persisting differences among countries’ copyright laws, conflict-of-
laws solutions to the multiplicity problem should assist in making 
effective cross-border enforcement feasible and thus positively im-
                                                                                                                            
31 Jack J. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1220 (1998). These 
limited abilities are shared by all countries and arise from the general limited abilities of 
countries to enforce their laws extraterritorially. See Trimble, supra note 8, at 11–19 
(discussing the difference between the territorial scope of prescriptive jurisdiction and the 
territorial scope of the actual enforcement power). 
32 E.g., Eric Priest, Acupressure: The Emerging Role of Market Ordering in Global 
Copyright Enforcement (forthcoming). 
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pact the functioning of copyright laws on the Internet. The ques-
tion is whether the existing proposals address the practical ineffi-
ciencies of cross-border copyright enforcement sufficiently to im-
prove on the status quo; it seems that even if countries were to 
adopt the conflict-of-laws rules that have been proposed many liti-
gation limitations would persist and continue to limit the number of 
countries’ laws that are de facto regulating conduct on the Internet 
in particular cases. 
This Article begins by analyzing the proposals for solving the 
multiplicity problem. The first part discusses proposals that seek to 
achieve single global copyright standards, and the second part 
presents proposed conflict-of-laws solutions. For each type of solu-
tion the Article reviews existing critiques of the proposals and ex-
amines additional rationales that make the proposals unacceptable 
or unpalatable to national governments, including, for the conflict-
of-laws solutions, the difficulty of accepting the notion of copyright 
infringement as a single-place tort. The third part confronts the 
theoretical concern about the multiplicity of potentially applicable 
copyright laws on the Internet and the realities of copyright en-
forcement. The Article posits that the proposed solutions, if im-
plemented, would not dramatically change the copyright litigation 
landscape because many of the current realities of cross-border 
copyright litigation would continue to shape the landscape. 
I. PROPOSALS FOR A GLOBAL COPYRIGHT 
The first type of solution proposed to address the multiplicity 
problem would introduce a single set of global copyright law stan-
dards.33 The uniform standards would give legal certainty to Inter-
net actors and copyright owners, who could then shape their activi-
ties to comport with the standards. Some observers might view the 
setting of uniform standards as a natural milestone on the trajecto-
ry of international copyright law negotiations through which coun-
tries have been gradually harmonizing their copyright laws over the 
past 130 years.34 However, the trajectory might not be so 
                                                                                                                            
33 E.g., Antonelli, supra note 27, at 177 (admitting that “the task seems almost 
impossible”). 
34 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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straightforward; current international developments do not seem 
to be headed towards a deeper harmonization of copyright law, 
commentators debate the desirability of international uniformity of 
copyright laws,35 and some critics flatly reject the utility of a uni-
form global copyright law.36 
A. A Single Copyright Law for the Online Environment 
Faced with the specter of a multiplicity of national laws (and 
not only copyright laws) on the Internet, some experts have sug-
gested that a new legal order be created to govern activities on the 
Internet.37 For these Internet exceptionalists, the process of creat-
ing a new legal order would provide an opportunity to design the 
order while respecting and utilizing the architecture of the Internet. 
The designing of the new legal order would also be a chance for ex-
perimentation—a chance to craft the legal order in a manner that 
would reflect opposition to entrenched copyright norms that exist-
ing national legal regimes perpetuate; the new legal order could 
promote norms that the online community has embraced. 
One problem with an extranational Internet-specific legal re-
gime is its legitimacy: Can anyone design a legal order for the In-
ternet that could legitimately bind all actors on the Internet? Leav-
ing the design of the legal regime to the community of Internet ac-
tors might have been attractive at the beginnings of the Internet 
when it was populated by a limited group of educated users in se-
                                                                                                                            
35 See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition under 
the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 11, 23–24, 44–48, 75–78 (1997); Jane 
C. Ginsburg, International Copyright: From A “Bundle” of National Copyright Laws to A 
Supranational Code?, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 265, 267 (2000) (“[N]ational laws 
allocating copyright ownership form the strongest candidates for preservation; national 
exceptions to copyright present a more difficult, but potentially persuasive, case for 
persistence of national norms as well.”). See also Austin, supra note 7 (commenting on the 
prospect of a single national copyright law applying in multinational cases and discussing 
the same rationales against a choice of law outcome). 
36 E.g., Graeme W. Austin, Valuing “Domestic Self-Determination” in International 
Intellectual Property Jurisprudence, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1155, 1158 (2002); Paul 
Torremans, Copyright Territoriality in a Borderless Online Environment, in COPYRIGHT IN A 
BORDERLESS ONLINE ENVIRONMENT 23, 35 (Johan Axhamn ed., 2012). 
37 David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 
48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1367 (1996) (“This . . . distinct Cyberspace . . . needs and can 
create its own law and legal institutions.”); Aron Mefford, Lex Informatica: Foundations of 
Law on the Internet, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 211, 222, 236–37 (1997). 
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lect countries; indeed, the approach worked for technical Internet 
architecture-specific issues such as standard setting and regulation 
of the domain name system, including the ICANN dispute resolu-
tion mechanism. However, with the complexities of the Internet 
ecosystem today, including the proliferation of different types of 
actors and activities on the Internet, it seems highly unlikely that it 
would be possible to identify (outside the framework of national 
and international law) a means for the design and adoption of an 
Internet-specific legal regime that would enjoy the requisite global 
legitimacy. If national courts were to follow Graeme Dinwoodie’s 
proposal and devise a special regime through their decisions, the 
special regime would alleviate the concern about legitimacy (per-
haps in some countries more than in others), but the judicially-
created system certainly would not eliminate the concern.38 
Another problem with the proposals for an Internet-specific le-
gal regime is that the proposals ignore the fact that Internet activi-
ties have strong connections to the offline world; because of the 
connections (not only in copyright but in most areas of the law) 
countries would be very unlikely to relinquish their prescriptive 
jurisdiction for the online world. If a motion picture is shared on-
line without the permission of or a license from its copyright own-
er, the effects of the free sharing will be felt in the offline world, 
and they will impact the copyright owner’s and licensees’ reve-
                                                                                                                            
38 Dinwoodie, supra note 2, at 542–43 (“Under this approach  . . .  a court faced with an 
international copyright dispute would  . . .  develop (and apply) a substantive rule of 
copyright law that best effectuates [the] range of policies [implicated in the dispute].”). 
For Dinwoodie’s response to the legitimacy problem see id. at 575–77. Annette Kur 
asserted that a judicially-developed, Internet-specific regime would decrease legal 
certainty “at least during the interim phase needed for building up a solid framework of 
case law.” EUROPEAN MAX PLANCK GROUP ON CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE CLIP PRINCIPLES AND 
COMMENTARY art. 3:603 n.7 (2013) [hereinafter CLIP PRINCIPLES]. For Dinwoodie’s 
response to concerns about legal certainty see Dinwoodie, supra note 2, pp. 571–75. See 
also Reindl, supra note 2, at 810–11 (criticizing “cyberspace lex mercatoria”); Joanna 
Kulesza & Roy Balleste, Signs and Portents in Cyberspace: The Rise of Jus Internet as a New 
Order in International Law, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1311, 1345 
(2013) (proposing a similar framework not limited to copyright law); Jane C. Ginsburg, 
The Private International Law of Copyright in An Era of Technological Change, in 
COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 239, 376–408 
(Matinus Nijhoff Publishers ed., 1998). 
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nues, together with countries’ tax revenues and other interests.39 
An Internet-specific legal regime inconsistent with a country’s own 
copyright law40 would destabilize the delicate balance that the 
country strives (or should strive) to achieve with its copyright poli-
cies. 
The skepticism toward an Internet-specific copyright regime 
does not mean that every Internet-specific legal regime is unsuita-
ble. Matters that concern the technical infrastructure of the net-
work require Internet-specific regulation, for example the adminis-
tration of the domain name system; Internet service provider liabil-
ity for content posted by others has also been subject to Internet-
specific legislation, including in the area of copyright law.41 Some 
Internet-specific regulation that addresses the technical infrastruc-
ture is subject to extranational regulation (e.g., again the domain 
name system); other Internet-specific regulation, such as limita-
tions on the liability of Internet service providers, is governed by 
national laws.42 However, even in the limited areas governed by 
extranational Internet-specific regulation countries maintain their 
right to have input into the final decisions.43 
Countries hesitate to outsource their control over fundamental 
rights to non-state bodies, and copyright law involves such rights 
because it results from a balancing of the right to free speech (free-
dom of expression) and the right to property (in some countries 
intellectual property is covered explicitly by the fundamental right 
                                                                                                                            
39 Peter K. Yu, Towards the Seamless Global Distribution of Cloud Content in PRIVACY 
AND LEGAL ISSUES IN CLOUD COMPUTING (Anne S. Y. Cheung & Rolf H. Weber eds.) 
(forthcoming 2015). 
40 Although an Internet-specific regime might match a country’s copyright law, the 
likelihood is high that some differences would exist because different institutions would 
shape the regime and the law. 
41 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012); 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012). 
42 In the EU, the provisions on the limitation of ISP liability are subject to very general 
harmonization through Articles 12–15 of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information 
Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market, 2000 O.J. (L 
178) [hereinafter EU E-Commerce Directive]. 
43 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2012) (the anti-cybersquatting provisions of the Lanham 
Act in the United States); Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de 
Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617 (4th Cir. 2003). 
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to property).44 Countries could in theory, by adopting an interna-
tional copyright law regime, address the need for an Internet-
specific copyright regime without outsourcing the regime to a non-
state body. An international law solution would obviate the prob-
lem of legitimacy; although negotiating an international regime en-
tails compromises that may constrain national policies and national 
sovereignty, international negotiations allow countries to maintain 
a certain degree of control over the design of the regime and con-
tribute to the shaping of the regime.45 Nevertheless, international 
agreement on a single copyright law for the Internet is unlikely to 
occur soon; a copyright law for the Internet that would be in har-
mony with the multiplicity of national copyright laws for the offline 
world would be difficult to create, and the likelihood that countries 
could agree on uniform copyright laws for the offline world is slim. 
Many countries appear reluctant to harmonize copyright laws more 
deeply than they already have. 
B. Uniform National Copyright Laws 
A cursory review of the history of treaties on copyright law 
might suggest a trajectory of gradually deepening harmonization of 
                                                                                                                            
44 E.g., Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 17(2), 2010 O.J. C 
83/02, at 395; GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] 
[GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBI. I (Ger.), art. 14 (interpreted by German courts as 
covering intellectual property). For IP-specific provisions in national constitutions, see 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; The Czech Republic’s Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms, Article 34; Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Section 13; 
Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Section 60. 
45 Graeme Dinwoodie has pointed out that international agreements concerning 
copyright have been, “in large part, codifications of commonly held, and already 
nationally implemented, copyright policies, and thus had a backward looking 
perspective.” Dinwoodie, supra note 2, at 493. This is a not a characteristic unique to 
international copyright negotiations; it is understandable that countries enter 
international negotiations with the goal of achieving a result consistent with their own 
legislation and practices, and countries with strong negotiating positions and political 
power often achieve their goals. The situation may be different if governments (or some 
factions in the governments) used the international forum to pursue domestic agendas 
they pursued unsuccessfully at the national level; the international forum may give the 
agendas legitimacy and impose the agendas on domestic actors once the agendas are 
embodied in international treaties that governments must implement. This strategy is 
commonly utilized in hierarchical settings, such as in regional organizations and federal 
countries. See also id. at 499–501 (“The relationship [of national, regional, and 
international developments] is increasingly complex and multidirectional.”). 
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national copyright laws, but while the impression is accurate with 
respect to the past 130 years, the trajectory might not be an accu-
rate predictor of the future of international copyright harmoniza-
tion. The TRIPS-plus movement, which wants to raise levels of 
intellectual property (“IP”) protection above the minimum stan-
dards contained in the TRIPS Agreement,46 has encountered 
strong opposition from numerous IP experts and at least some of 
the general public. The general public’s intense concern for the 
proper protection of IP users’ interests makes expansions of IP 
rights and increased protection of IP rights highly unpopular. A 
deeper harmonization of exceptions and limitations might find 
more supporters, but even this direction of harmonization faces 
opposition, namely from copyright owners; for example, some cop-
yright owners observed the negotiations of the Marrakesh Treaty47 
with great concern as to whether the Treaty, which solidifies cer-
tain exceptions and limitations to copyright in favor of access for 
the visually impaired,48 could become a Trojan horse for a future 
weakening of copyright protection through international treaties.49 
The concerns of particular stakeholders about stronger or 
weaker copyright protection are not the only brakes on further in-
ternational copyright harmonization. The environment at the in-
ternational level is sufficiently infused with conflict to retard fur-
ther harmonization efforts. The agendas of the developed countries 
conflict with the plans of the developing and the least developed 
countries, which are pursuing an international agenda for the pro-
tection of traditional knowledge, folklore, and genetic resources. A 
number of experts have emphasized the value of diversity in na-
                                                                                                                            
46 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8. 
47 Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are 
Blind, Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled, June 31, 2013, WIPO Doc. 
VIP/DC/8, available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/vip_dc/vip_
dc_8_rev.pdf [hereinafter Marrakesh Treaty]. 
48 The Marrakesh Treaty does not impose exceptions and limitations that go beyond 
the existing three-step-test framework. See id. at art. 1 and the Agreed Statement 
Concerning Article 4(3). 
49 See, e.g., William New, Negotiators, Stakeholders Tell Tale of WIPO Marrakesh Treaty 
Negotiation, Look to Implementation, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Sept. 20, 2013), 
http://www.ip-watch.org/2013/09/20/negotiators-stakeholders-tell-tale-of-wipo-
marrakesh-treaty-negotiation-look-to-implementation/. 
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tional IP legislation50 and argued in favor of greater use of existing 
treaty flexibilities to tailor IP regimes to countries’ unique circums-
tances. Historical, cultural, sociopolitical, and economic differenc-
es among countries are among the reasons for which individually-
tailored national copyright laws seem desirable, and national gov-
ernments seem more active than they were only a decade ago in 
searching for ways to stretch national legislation and practice to 
benefit fully from the range of flexibilities that are provided in in-
ternational treaties.51 
Even if countries could agree on a uniform set of copyright law 
standards, some national differences would persist and/or develop 
over time. With no unified court structure, differences would ap-
pear; a truly uniform legal regime cannot exist without a unifying 
interpretation that all courts and administrative agencies would 
have to follow. With no uniform interpretation national courts and 
administrative agencies develop different interpretations of stan-
dards and perpetuate existing or create new differences among na-
tional copyright laws, notwithstanding identical language in nation-
al copyright statutes. Absent a court or other body that renders de-
cisions that are precedential and/or delivers binding interpretations 
of uniform standards, does so with sufficient frequency to develop 
the necessary breadth and depth of interpretation, and reacts to 
permanently changing conditions, the uniformity of national copy-
right laws is illusory. Additionally, even if copyright laws were uni-
form, differences in laws that national courts would apply to ancil-
lary issues, such as contract issues, and differences in procedural 
rules would maintain or create differences in the functioning of the 
“uniform” laws in various countries.52 
II. PROPOSED CONFLICT-OF-LAWS SOLUTIONS 
If national courts adjudicate cases that involve parties from dif-
ferent countries and/or implicate different national copyright laws, 
                                                                                                                            
50 E.g., Dinwoodie, supra note 2, at 518–21. 
51 E.g., Ruth Okediji, Legal Innovation in International Intellectual Property Relations: 
Twenty One Years of the TRIPS Agreement, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L LAW (forthcoming 2015). 
52 For a discussion of the situation involving EU unitary rights (trademarks and 
designs) see Marketa Trimble, Extraterritorial Enforcement, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
SYSTEMS IN COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW, 303, 321–22 (Toshiko Takenaka ed., 2013). 
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the courts face questions of jurisdiction, choice of applicable law, 
and potentially also the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments—all of which are conflict-of-laws questions.53 The more 
deeply that national laws are harmonized, however, the less signifi-
cant will be the consequences of the choice-of-law analysis;54 if 
copyright laws were uniform, choice of law, at least as to the appli-
cable copyright law, would be unnecessary.55 Operating on the 
premise that the likelihood is very high that national copyright laws 
will remain different, some scholars who seek to identify solutions 
to the multiplicity problem focus on conflict-of-laws rules, includ-
ing rules for choice of applicable law, as the avenue for solving the 
problem. 
Under the prevailing choice-of-law rule the laws of all countries 
connected to the Internet might apply to Internet activities. Copy-
right vests automatically in (in some countries upon fixation, in 
other countries upon creation), at a minimum, all 168 countries 
that are parties to the Berne Convention.56 When a work is made 
available on the Internet, that act can infringe copyright in multiple 
or even in all of the countries in which the content can be viewed, 
downloaded, or streamed. Of course countries’ laws differ, and 
there can be no infringement committed in countries where the 
work falls outside copyright protection (because of the subject mat-
ter of the work,57 its author,58 or the expiration of its copyright 
term59), or in countries in which the act is not considered infringing 
                                                                                                                            
53 See also Goldsmith, supra note 31, at 1232 (noting that a variety of available tools to 
“facilitate and rationalize legal regulation of cyberspace  . . .  will not eliminate all conflict 
of laws in cyberspace any more than they do in real space.  . . .  [T]he elimination of 
conflict of laws would require the elimination of decentralized lawmaking or of 
transnational activity.”). 
54 See Trimble, supra note 8 (discussing the relationship between substantive law and 
choice of law rules). 
55 Choice of law will still matter for ancillary substantive issues; even if treaties 
“harmonize national copyright laws comprehensively enough,” they will not render the 
choice of law analysis obsolete. Cf. Reindl, supra note 2, at 812. 
56 Contracting Parties to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/documents/pdf/ 
berne.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2015). 
57 E.g., because of different requirements for originality. 
58 E.g., works by the US federal government in the United States. 
59 Under international treaties, many countries must provide copyright protection for 
at least a minimum period but countries may provide a longer term of protection. Berne 
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(because of a different interpretation of the particular right or be-
cause of an applicable exception or limitation to copyright protec-
tion). Regardless of whether the laws of all countries hold the work 
protected and the act infringing, the possibility exists that all coun-
tries’ laws could apply simultaneously.60 
Existing rules of personal jurisdiction and choice of law do not 
provide relief from the multiplicity problem, at least not in theory. 
Courts of general jurisdiction61 may decide all claims raised against 
an alleged infringer—irrespective of whether the claims are based 
on their own country’s laws or are based on foreign laws—as long 
as the courts consider the foreign-law claims to be transitory causes 
of action, meaning causes of action that may be litigated before 
them even if the causes of action arose under a foreign country’s 
law. Courts in some countries have expressed a willingness to treat 
copyright infringement as a transitory cause of action,62 meaning 
that the courts could decide worldwide copyright infringements 
                                                                                                                            
Convention, supra note 4, at art. 7; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 12; Beijing 
Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, June 24, 2012, WIPO Doc. AVP/DC/20, available 
at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/avp_dc/avp_dc_20.pdf. Also, 
copyright terms to the same work may expire at different times under the laws of the 
United States and other countries, including the country of the work’s origin, because of 
the copyright term restoration provisions of the US Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 104A 
(2012). 
60 See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing geoblocking—the possibility of 
limiting the accessibility of content on the Internet and thus the number of countries 
whose laws apply to the content). 
61 General jurisdiction exists where the alleged infringer has its domicile, which can be, 
depending on local laws, its place of residence, its place of incorporation, or its principal 
place of business. See, e.g., Regulation 1215/2012, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 December 2012 on the Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (recast), 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1, 7, 18, arts. 4, 63 
[hereinafter Brussels I Regulation (recast)]. In the United States, general jurisdiction 
exists in the forum state when a corporation’s “affiliations with the State are so 
‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [the corporation] essentially at home in the 
forum State.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 
(2011). 
62 See London Film Productions Ltd. v. Intercontinental Communications, Inc., 580 F. 
Supp. 47, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Creative Technology Ltd. v. Aztech Sys. PTE, Ltd., 61 
F.3d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 1995); Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Ainsworth, [2011] UKSC 39; Jedis Ltd. v 
Vodafone New Zealand Ltd. [2012] NZHC 2448, ¶ 39. See also infra notes 200 and 201 and 
accompanying text. Cf. Gallo Africa Ltd. v Sting Music 2010 (6) SA 329 (SCA) (pre-dating 
the UK Supreme Court decision in Lucasfilm). 
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while applying the laws of all the countries in which infringements 
occur. 
Litigating in one court under multiple national copyright laws 
should not be possible if the court is a court of specific jurisdiction 
because courts of specific jurisdiction adjudicate only causes of ac-
tion arising within their jurisdiction and relating to a ground of spe-
cific jurisdiction. In copyright infringement cases specific jurisdic-
tion typically exists in the place of infringement, and because the 
laws of all countries connected to the Internet may be infringed by 
Internet activities, the courts of all countries may have specific ju-
risdiction63 (the court of the alleged infringer’s domicile maintains 
general jurisdiction) and therefore can apply their own laws to the 
infringement that occurred in their countries. 
This part reviews two choice-of-law approaches that may limit 
the number of laws applicable to Internet activities. The first ap-
proach (the “localization approach”) uses the existing choice-of-
law rule of the place of the tortious activity but shifts the focus of 
the localization of the tort (the identification of the place of the 
tort) to an occurrence or fact that can be pinpointed in a single lo-
cation, such as the place where the alleged infringer acted or the 
place where the copyright owner is domiciled, under the theory 
that the act or occurrence marks the one place where the tort was 
actually committed or where all of its effects are felt.64 The second 
approach (the “factors approach”) requires countries to adopt a 
new choice-of-law rule that calls on courts to choose a single appli-
cable national copyright law (or a small number of applicable na-
tional copyright laws) based on a weighing of multiple factors. 
The implementation of the two choice-of-law approaches 
presents obstacles no less significant than those that countries 
would encounter if they attempted to introduce a single global cop-
yright standard. Although the choice-of-law approaches would re-
                                                                                                                            
63 Cf. infra Part III.B. 
64 The discussions of this approach mirror the general debates about tort localization. 
See, e.g., 2 ERNST RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 233 (1947); 3 
ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG & ERIK JAYME, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: A COMPARATIVE 
TREATISE ON AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS LAW, INCLUDING THE LAW OF 
ADMIRALTY 64 (1977); C.G.J. MORSE, TORTS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 113 
(1978). 
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lieve the pressure that countries would face if they were to harmon-
ize their substantive laws, and the approaches would allow coun-
tries to maintain their different national copyright laws, the ap-
proaches would require collective action on choice-of-law rules; 
only if all countries adopted the same approach would choice-of-
law approaches be successful in eliminating the multiplicity prob-
lem. Agreeing on choice-of-law approaches might be challenging, 
particularly since the approaches would only solve the multiplicity 
problem if they were combined with appropriate rules for personal 
jurisdiction; the negotiations of the proposed Hague Convention 
have demonstrated the difficulty that countries have in harmoniz-
ing rules of personal jurisdiction internationally.65 
A. The Localization Approach 
The localization approach to solving the multiplicity problem 
seeks to identify an occurrence or fact that can be understood as 
the place of a tortious activity and be localized in a single place. 
One possible place is the place from which the allegedly infringing 
activity emanates, or “[t]he point of origin of the alleged infringe-
ment”66—the place where the alleged infringer acted. On the In-
ternet this rule might lead to the alleged infringer’s domicile, if that 
is where the infringer acted, but it could lead to another jurisdiction 
if the infringer acted in the other jurisdiction (e.g., the alleged in-
fringer might have uploaded content while on vacation abroad). 
Another localization might be in the domicile of the copyright 
owner; the theory for this approach is that the place of the tortious 
                                                                                                                            
65 The proposal to draft a convention on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters began to be discussed by the Special 
Commission on General Affairs and Policy of the Hague Conference in 1994. In 2002 The 
Hague Conference decided to postpone work on the draft and ordered a new draft to be 
prepared that would avoid conflicts among countries on rules of jurisdiction. The Hague 
Conference reopened the project for a general convention on jurisdiction and recognition 
and enforcement in 2012. See The Judgments Project, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=text.display&tid=149 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2015). 
66 AM. LAW INST., INTELLECTUAL PROP.: PRINCIPLES GOVERNING JURISDICTION, 
CHOICE OF LAW, AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES § 321 n.1 (2008) 
[hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES]. 
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activity is the place in which the entire harm is concentrated—the 
place where the harm is internalized by the copyright owner.67 
Critics argue that the localization approach is problematic be-
cause the operative occurrence or fact can be manipulated. Their 
concern is that the alleged infringer can easily choose the place 
from which he acts, and that the copyright owner can easily choose 
the place where he is domiciled. The expected result of the race to 
the bottom and the race to the top is that prospective infringers will 
move their activities to jurisdictions having the weakest copyright 
protection (the weakest protection being caused by either less cop-
yright owner protective legislation or ineffective enforcement), 
while copyright owners will relocate to jurisdictions with the 
strongest copyright protection.68 It is debatable to what extent this 
concern is valid; historical, legal, financial, technical, and logistical 
considerations are some of the many considerations that influence 
decisions that determine the location of particular persons and ent-
ities. Some persons and entities will indeed relocate to a particular 
jurisdiction solely or primarily because of the favorable legal envi-
ronment that the jurisdiction offers, which may include weaker 
copyright protection.69 The question is whether choice-of-law rules 
are the proper vehicle for countries to address problems with a ju-
risdiction that develops a reputation as a haven for alleged infring-
ers; countries may reach for means other than choice-of-law rules 
to achieve the goal of adequate protection of copyright. The follow-
                                                                                                                            
67 Paul Geller proposed that courts “localise the place of infringement in the country of 
the targeted market.” Paul Geller, International Intellectual Property, Conflict of Laws and 
Internet Remedies, 22(3) EIPR 125, 129 (2000). This approach is not discussed in detail in 
this section because the analysis for this approach involves additional factors; therefore, 
the approach is included under the “factors approach.” The approach may or may not 
lead to a limitation on the number of applicable laws. Jane Ginsburg proposed that in 
some circumstances courts should apply “the law of the place of the server or of the 
defendant’s domicile.” Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Without Borders? Choice of Forum and 
Choice of Law for Copyright Infringement in Cyberspace, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 153, 
173 (1997). The rule of the place of the server may be viewed as a variation on the rule of 
the place from which the infringement originates because in many cases the result will be 
identical. See also infra note 83 and the accompanying text. 
68 Global Use/Territorial Rights, supra note 4, at 336; Ginsburg, supra note 26, at 44; 
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 66, § 321 cmt. 1 and Reporter’s Notes; DREXL, supra note 7, at 
291–96; CLIP PRINCIPLES, supra note 39, at art. 3:603 cmt. 7. 
69 E.g., Kazaa was based in Vanuatu; Megaupload Ltd. is incorporated in Hong Kong. 
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ing sections discuss additional advantages and disadvantages pre-
sented by the two localization rules. 
1. Localization in the Place of Origin of the Alleged 
Infringement 
The rule that localizes copyright infringement in the place of 
origin of the alleged infringement—in the place where the alleged 
infringer acted—promotes, to the extent that the national copy-
right policies of the countries are different, the copyright policies of 
the alleged infringer’s jurisdiction to the detriment of the policies 
of the copyright owner’s jurisdiction.70 The rule promotes the in-
terests of the infringer’s jurisdiction in shaping the conduct of In-
ternet users; the jurisdiction might punish Internet users for copy-
right infringing conduct (including through punitive damages if the 
jurisdiction’s law provides for them),71 but it might also protect 
Internet actors’ interests through exceptions and limitations to 
copyright. The rule does not promote the policies of the copyright 
owner’s jurisdiction, nor does the rule promote the copyright poli-
cies of any other jurisdictions where the content is accessed or ac-
cessible.72 Naturally, an inability to promote certain interests in 
cross-border scenarios will be mitigated when countries’ interests 
are identical or sufficiently similar. 
From the perspective of legal certainty, the rule is advanta-
geous for Internet actors because they can easily determine ex ante 
which copyright law regulates their conduct,73 and they can rely on 
that law always applying to their conduct regardless of where the 
copyright-protected work at issue and its copyright owner originate 
and which country’s court might render a decision on an actor’s 
conduct. The rule is disadvantageous to copyright owners because 
they cannot predict which copyright laws will govern Internet ac-
                                                                                                                            
70 Ginsburg, supra note 26, at 44 (“[T]he point of origin approach has the effect of 
extruding the country of origin’s copyright policy choices, to the detriment of copyright 
policies in the other countries of receipt.”). 
71 Punitive damages in copyright are not awarded only in common law jurisdictions; 
some civil law jurisdictions also provide for punitive damages. See, e.g., Copyright and 
Related Rights Act of 1995 (as last amended on Dec. 15, 2006) (in force Jan. 13, 2007), art. 
168 (Slovn.), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=180840. 
72 Ginsburg, supra note 26, at 44. 
73 The determination could be complicated if the location of the conduct is disputed. 
See infra notes 92–100 and accompanying text. 
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tors’ conduct, and they will have to familiarize themselves ex post 
with whatever foreign country’s law will govern the actions of the 
actors and determine whether copyright was infringed. 
The localization approach that uses the place of origin of an in-
fringement as the operative fact aligns well with the current rules of 
personal jurisdiction, as long as an alleged infringer acts in the 
place of his domicile; in this scenario a court in the place of the al-
leged infringer’s domicile has general jurisdiction, meaning that 
the court may decide all claims brought against the alleged infring-
er.74 Under the rule of the place of origin of an infringement, if the 
alleged infringer acts in his domicile the court of his domicile 
would apply the law of its country (the forum law) and decide the 
infringement worldwide. Courts in other countries would have 
specific jurisdiction based on the place of the tortious activity, 
which would allow those other courts to adjudicate only infringe-
ments that occurred in their respective countries; however, those 
other courts would also apply the law of the alleged infringement’s 
origin to decide the case. 
That a court of general jurisdiction would apply the forum 
law—the national law with which the court is most familiar—to a 
worldwide infringement would certainly be a significant benefit of 
this rule. There is nothing inherently problematic about a court 
having to apply foreign law; courts must and do apply foreign law 
from time to time. However, there is value in having a court apply 
the forum law. The value would not be realized, however, if the 
alleged infringer acted outside the country of his domicile, for ex-
ample while on vacation;75 in this case the rule would mean that the 
court of general jurisdiction, which would be the court of the al-
leged infringer’s domicile, would have to apply the law of the for-
eign jurisdiction where the infringing activity occurred to adjudi-
cate the infringement worldwide, including in the jurisdiction of 
the court and the infringer’s domicile. The court that would be 
most familiar with the foreign law, the court in the foreign country, 
would have only specific jurisdiction and could decide only the in-
fringement in its own country. 
                                                                                                                            
74 See supra note 61 and accompanying text for an explanation of general jurisdiction. 
75 See Ginsburg, note 67, at 172 (noting that “to some extent, the ‘point of origin’ 
approach and the defendant’s domicile may converge”). 
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The localization approach that is based on the place from which 
infringing conduct emanates is not an abstract academic construct; 
the approach, which is based on the “emission theory,” found a 
place in the European Union (“EU”) Satellite and Cable Direc-
tive76 and in the EU E-Commerce Directive.77 The EU Satellite 
and Cable Directive localizes the “act of communication to the 
public by satellite” “solely  . . .  where  . . .  signals are introduced 
into an uninterrupted chain of communication”;78 the EU E-
Commerce Directive makes only the law of the country in which a 
service provider is established applicable to the service provider’s 
activities, and limits a country’s ability to regulate service provid-
ers who are established in other EU member countries.79 While the 
EU Satellite and Cable Directive concerns neighboring (“copy-
right-related”) rights,80 the EU E-Commerce Directive makes the 
emission principle inapplicable to “copyright, neighboring rights, 
 . . .  and  . . .  industrial property rights.”81 
Jane Ginsburg recommended the emission principle for copy-
right infringement cases in a 1995 article; she called for the applica-
tion of the law of “the country from which the infringing act or acts 
originated” only if an additional factor was satisfied: the law was 
also the forum law. In concert with some other commentators she 
also proposed the use of localization in other places that could all 
be understood as alternatives to the place of origin of the infringe-
ment; she suggested that the forum law should also apply if it is the 
law of “the country in which the defendant resides or of which it is 
a national or domiciliary; or the country in which the defendant 
maintains an effective business establishment.”82 Other commen-
                                                                                                                            
76 Council Directive 93/83/EEC, of 27 September 1993 on the Coordination of Certain 
Rules Concerning Copyright and Rights Related to Copyright Applicable to Satellite 
Broadcasting and Cable R,etransmission 1993 O.J. (L 248) 15 [hereinafter EU Satellite 
and Cable Directive]. 
77 EU E-Commerce Directive, supra note 42. 
78 EU Satellite and Cable Directive, supra note 76, at art.1(2)(b). 
79 EU E-Commerce Directive, supra note 42, at art. 3(1) & (2). 
80 EU Satellite and Cable Directive, supra note 76, at art. 5. 
81 EU E-Commerce Directive, supra note 42, at art. 3(3) & Annex. 
82 Global Use/Territorial Rights, supra note 4, at 338; see also Ginsburg, supra note 67, at 
171, 173 (proposing that “if it is possible to localize in the United States the point from 
which the unauthorized communication becomes available to the public (wherever that 
public be located), then US law should apply to all unauthorized copies, wherever 
communicated” and for defendants who are not domiciled in the United States and who 
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tators proposed variations of the rule of the place of origin of the 
infringement; for example they suggested applying the law of the 
place of the server.83 Mark Kightlinger proposed the EU E-
Commerce Directive approach as a model for international internet 
regulation.84 
Some commentators have noted that the rule that localizes the 
place of infringement in the place of origin of the infringement is 
similar to the “root copy approach” that some US courts have 
adopted; under that approach “the extraterritorial infringements 
are all the direct consequences of a local US infringement.”85 
However, in the cases cited for this proposition, US courts have 
not applied US law to activities abroad but they have applied US 
law solely to acts that occurred in the United States, and the courts 
then used the constructive trust theory to justify the recovery of 
profits that accrued from outside the United States but emanated 
from infringing acts in the United States.86 The results of the appli-
cation of the root copy approach are similar to the results that US 
courts would have achieved if they had applied US law to activities 
outside the United States, and indeed copyright owners resort to 
the root copy approach as an alternative to litigating under multiple 
copyright laws; this use of the root copy approach will be discussed 
                                                                                                                            
acted from outside the United States, proposing that US courts apply “either  . . .  the law 
of the place of the server or of the defendant’s domicile.”); Jane C. Ginsburg, 
Extraterritoriality and Multiterritoriality in Copyright Infringement, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 587, 
600 (1997). 
83 See generally Austin, supra note 7, at 592. 
84 See Mark F. Kightlinger, A Solution to the Yahoo! Problem? The EC E-Commerce 
Directive as A Model for International Cooperation on Internet Choice of Law, 24 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 719 (2003). 
85 Global Use/Territorial Rights, supra note 4, at 335. 
86 Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45, 48–52 (2d Cir. 1939) 
(“[A]n infringer  . . . is like any other constructive trustee. . . . The negatives were 
‘records’ from which the work could be ‘reproduced’, and it was a tort to make them in 
this country. The plaintiffs acquired an equitable interest in them as soon as they were 
made, which attached to any profits from their exploitation, whether in the form of money 
remitted to the United States, or of increase in the value of shares of foreign companies 
held by the defendants.  . . . [A]s soon as any of the profits so realized took the form of 
property whose situs was in the United States, our law seized upon them and impressed 
them with a constructive trust . . .”). See also Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publ’g, Ltd., 843 
F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1988); LA News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, 340 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
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later.87 The results, however, are not identical. It appears that US 
courts will award profits lost because of the activities abroad but 
not damages attributable to the activities abroad;88 also, only profits 
linked to a specific type of infringement in the United States will be 
recoverable,89 and statutory damages will not be available for acts 
committed outside the United States.90 Additionally, a judgment 
awarding foreign profits under the constructive trust theory will 
not result in the adjudicated case being res judicata for copyright 
infringement claims under the copyright laws of the foreign coun-
tries covered by the foreign profit award.91 
Some commentators have argued that the localization ap-
proach, when its use is based on any act occurring on the Internet, 
is unfit for the ubiquitous medium that the Internet represents;92 
for example, the ALI Principles contend that the point of origin can 
be difficult to identify on “digital networks, particularly in the con-
text of peer-to-peer exchanges.”93 Undeniably, acts on the Internet 
can often be localized in multiple places;94 the localization can fo-
                                                                                                                            
87 See infra Part III.A. 
88 See, e.g., LA News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, 340 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2003). 
89 See, e.g., Robert Stigwood Group Ltd. v. O’Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1101 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(“It is only when the type of infringement permits further reproduction abroad that its 
exploitation abroad becomes the subject of a constructive trust.”). 
90 Courts award statutory damages per infringed work; statutory damages cover only 
works infringed under the US Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012). 
91 If the copyright owner subsequently raised his infringement claims under foreign 
laws, a court would presumably take the existing profit award into consideration when 
deciding on remedies in the subsequent proceeding. 
92 Reindl, supra note 2, at 815 (“Efforts to localize infringing conduct on digital 
networks may be criticized for being too attached to conventional concepts of territorial 
laws and not sensitive enough for the non-territorial and extranational nature of digital 
networks.”); Dinwoodie, supra note 2, at 535 (“The place where an act of alleged 
infringement ‘occurs’ has become difficult to determine in the digital environment; 
concepts such as ‘place’ of publication or ‘country of origin’ lose meaning in a global and 
digital world, where geography holds less significance.”). 
93 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 66, § 321 cmt.1. 
94 Some US courts have localized publication in the United States when the person 
who posted the content on the Internet was located outside the United States when the 
person posted the content. See, e.g., Kernal Records OY v. Mosley, 794 F. Supp. 2d 1355 
(S.D. Fla. 2011). But cf. Moberg v. 33T LLC, 666 F. Supp. 2d 415 (D. Del. 2009); Rogers 
v. The Better Business Bureau of Metropolitan Houston, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 2d 722 (S.D. 
Tex. 2012). See also Thomas F. Cotter, Toward a Functional Definition of Publication in 
Copyright Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1724, 1747–50 (2008); Dinwoodie, supra note 2, at 537 
366 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXV:339 
cus on the technical features of an act (e.g., where the bits are set in 
motion and/or where they travel on the network when a user re-
quests a website) or on the human aspects of an act (e.g., where the 
person used a keyboard or other hardware when the person posted 
content on a website).95 
The evolution of the Internet and of courts’ understanding of 
the Internet seem to have progressed to the point at which courts 
focus on the human aspects of acts—the location of the alleged in-
fringer and the accessibility (by humans) of the work, which seems 
to be a reasonable result given the number of locations through 
which data travel and where data reside on the network.96 For ex-
ample, when a user posted a work online while the user was in 
Canada, a US court found that the act of displaying the work pub-
licly occurred in Canada (where the user was located when he 
acted), but that it also occurred in the United States and other 
countries where users had access to the work on the Internet.97 
Places through which the data might have traveled without humans 
accessing them seemed irrelevant in the analysis, as a number of 
courts rejected localization based on purely technical features that 
would lead, for example, to localization based on the locations of 
servers that happen to be involved in the transmission of content.98 
                                                                                                                            
(“[I]n a digital world  . . .  publication may occur simultaneously in a number of 
countries.”). 
95 For a discussion of localization of acts on the Internet see Trimble, supra note 1, at 
607–10. 
96 John Rothchild, Protecting the Digital Consumer: The Limits of Cyberspace Utopianism, 
74 IND. L.J. 893, 981 (1999) (“Jurisdiction should not depend on the physical location of 
the various computers that enable online communications, or the location of the owners 
of those computers, but rather on the location of the parties to online communications.”); 
Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack, 2014 BCSC 1063, ¶ 146 (“[T]he injunction would 
compel Google to take steps in California or the state in which its search engine is 
controlled.”). 
97 See, e.g., Shropshire v. Canning, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1145–47 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
98 DAN JERKER B. SVANTESSON, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE INTERNET 
356–57 (2012). Cf. Ginsburg, supra note 67, at 173 (proposing that “the law of the place of 
the server” should apply in some circumstances) and JANE C. GINSBURG, WIPO, PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE PROTECTION OF WORKS AND OBJECTS OF RELATED 
RIGHTS TRANSMITTED THROUGH DIGITAL NETWORKS 45 (1998), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/gcpic/gcpic_2.pdf. 
 The “server test” established for personal jurisdiction in Perfect 10 v. Google Inc.,  
concerned the incorporation of content that is posted by a third party (hyperlinking) and 
prefers the human aspect approach, which leads to the party that posted the content on 
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Localization of persons on the Internet has become easier in re-
cent years as identification and geolocation technologies have 
evolved to assist in localizing acts on the Internet; this localizing 
renders the Internet less of a borderless space than it was once per-
ceived to be.99 It may be difficult to localize an Internet user at the 
particular moment when the user engaged in a specific activity on 
the Internet, but in most cases localization is possible, albeit with 
costs that might be higher than the costs would be for localization 
in the offline environment.100 
2. Localization in the Copyright Owner’s Domicile 
The rule that localizes copyright infringement in the place of a 
copyright owner’s domicile promotes the copyright policy of the 
copyright owner’s country101—the country can effectively legislate 
for the copyright owner’s compensation and influence prospective 
copyright owner conduct in a manner consistent with the country’s 
copyright policies. If the interests of the countries involved are dif-
                                                                                                                            
the Internet. The term “server test” is derived from “serving the content.” The test 
does not create personal jurisdiction in the jurisdiction where the servers are located; it 
points to the party that serves the infringing content on the Internet as the infringer. 416 F. 
Supp. 2d 828, 839, 843 (9th Cir. 2006). See also Case C-523/10, Wintersteiger AG v. 
Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH, 2012 E.C.R. 90, ¶ 36 (“[T]he place of 
establishment of [a search engine] server cannot, by reason of its uncertain location, be 
considered to be the place where the event giving rise to the damage occurred for the 
purpose of the application of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001.”). 
 US courts have found jurisdiction based on the place of a server—for example when 
the server itself was the location of the tortious conduct or of its effects, e.g., the location 
of misappropriation of trade secrets that were stored on the server, such as in 
MacDermid, Inc. v. Deiter, 702 F.3d 725, 726–27 (2d Cir. 2012), or the location of the 
unauthorized use of the server that resulted in damages, such as in Intercon, Inc. v. Bell 
Atlantic Internet Solutions, Inc., 205 F.3d 1244, 1246 (10th Cir. 2000). 
99 E.g., Global Use/Territorial Rights, supra note 4, at 320; Ginsburg, supra note 67, at 
153. Cf. Rothchild, supra note 96, at 926–29 (commenting on the “ease of evading 
detection”); Dinwoodie, supra note 2, at 535 (referring to the digital world as a world 
“where geography holds less significance”). See also Goldsmith, supra note 31, at 1203–26 
(arguing that cyberspace is not a borderless medium and discussing filtering in 1998 as a 
“technology [that] is relatively new and still relatively crude”). 
100 See Goldsmith, supra note 31, at 1235–36 (pointing out that difficulties with 
localization are not limited to cyberspace but appear in the offline world as well); Graeme 
W. Austin, Domestic Laws and Foreign Rights: Choice of Law in Transnational Copyright 
Infringement Litigation, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 25 (1999) (“[I]n transnational law, 
the concept of the place of harm is relatively easy to manipulate.”). 
101 The policy includes the country’s decision on who the copyright owner is. 
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ferent, the interests of an alleged infringer’s country in protecting 
users’ interests will not be promoted under this rule, nor will be the 
interests of that country in regulating (punishing) alleged infring-
ers’ conduct. The rule does not promote the copyright policies of 
other jurisdictions where the content is accessed or accessible. 
If countries view only one person or entity as the owner of a 
particular copyright and agree on the location of his or its domi-
cile,102 the rule of the copyright owner’s domicile enhances the le-
gal certainty of the copyright owner, who can rely on the laws of his 
own jurisdiction applying to acts on the Internet, regardless of 
where acts of infringement occur and which country’s court de-
cides the case. For an Internet actor, legal certainty will be weaker 
than it will be under the rule of the place of the infringing activity’s 
origin because under the rule of the copyright owner’s domicile the 
actor must determine the identity and domicile of the copyright 
owner, and do so under the law of the country of the copyright 
owner’s domicile—a country that the actor cannot know until he 
identifies who the copyright owner might be.103 An additional com-
plexity arises when multiple owners of the same copyright exist be-
cause of countries’ differing rules on copyright ownership.104 Pro-
vided that all jurisdictions agree on who the copyright owner is and 
where the copyright owner is domiciled, once the Internet actor 
determines the country where the copyright owner is domiciled the 
actor must familiarize himself with the copyright law of that coun-
try, which may be burdensome if the Internet actor deals with mul-
tiple copyright-protected works governed by different copyright 
laws. 
The interoperability of the rule of the copyright owner’s domi-
cile with the current rules of personal jurisdiction is less harmo-
nious than is the interoperability of the rule of the place of the in-
fringement’s origin with the current rules of personal jurisdiction. 
Unless the copyright owner’s and alleged infringer’s domiciles are 
the same country, the court most familiar with the applicable law—
the court of the country of the copyright owner’s domicile—has 
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only specific jurisdiction and can adjudicate infringement only 
within its own country. The court of general jurisdiction—the 
court of the country of the alleged infringer’s domicile—will have 
to apply foreign law (the law of the copyright owner’s domicile) to 
adjudicate worldwide infringement. While the advantage of apply-
ing a single country’s law to cover infringements worldwide exists 
under this rule just as it does under the rule that localizes infringe-
ment in the place of origin of the alleged infringement, the disad-
vantage under this rule is that the court having jurisdiction to de-
cide worldwide infringement must apply foreign law. 
The rule of the place of the copyright owner’s domicile has not 
found its place in copyright law but commentators have entertained 
the rule as a theoretically sound possibility. Jane Ginsburg ex-
plained the reasoning behind the rule, which recognizes that “the 
harm goes to the author’s personality (violation of moral rights), 
and to her pocket (violation of economic rights).”105 Graeme Aus-
tin characterized the rule as the result of “a reconceptualization of 
transnational copyright infringement as harm to domestic econom-
ic interests,”106 and Andrew Guzman argued that “residence and 
domicile  . . .  [t]o the extent that they are closely related to the lo-
cation of effects  . . .  may serve as proxies for effects”107 of copy-
right infringement. 
A rule that would point to the law of the place of the origin of 
the work108 could be regarded as a version of this approach under 
the assumption that the place of origin of the work is also the place 
where the harm accrues. As Silke von Lewinski noted, the principle 
of country of origin appeared in one international copyright treaty, 
the Convention of Montevideo on Literary and Artistic Property of 
                                                                                                                            
105 Global Use/Territorial Rights, supra note 4, at 41. See also Jane C. Ginsburg & Myriam 
Gauthier, The Celestial Jukebox and Earthbound Courts: Judicial Competence in the 
European Union and the United States Over Copyright Infringements in Cyberspace, 173 
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR 85, 135 (1997) (“One might  . . . contend 
that copyright infringement, and particularly moral rights infringement, implicate 
personal rights; the ‘place where the harmful event occurred’ with respect to personal 
rights would be the place where the copyright owner/author feels the harm, that is at the 
place of her domicile.”). 
106 Austin, supra note 100, at 26; see also Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New 
Foundations, 90 GEO. L. J. 883, 920 (2002). 
107 Guzman, supra note 106, at 920. 
108 Austin, supra note 7, at 592. 
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11 January 1889, which today has been superseded by other more 
widely-adopted copyright treaties.109 Some critics argue that one of 
the other treaties, the Berne Convention, precludes the rule of the 
place of origin of the work because Article 5(2) of the Convention 
includes a provision that some interpret as a choice-of-law provi-
sion pointing to the law of the protecting country (“the country 
where protection is claimed”).110 The provision disallows the ap-
plication of the law of the country of origin to “the extent of pro-
tection, as well as the means of redress,” but the provision seems 
to leave open the possibility that the law of the country of the copy-
right owner’s domicile will apply as long as the country can be 
identified as the protecting country “where protection is 
claimed.”111 
The choice-of-law rule of the place of the copyright owner’s 
domicile has a parallel in the law of defamation. The “multiple 
publication rule” in defamation is consistent with the traditional 
notion of choice of law for copyright infringement because the rule 
“treats each communication of defamatory matter to a recipient as 
a separate publication,”112 thus allowing for a multiplicity of appli-
cable laws and available litigation fora because, for the purposes of 
defamation, publication occurs every time “defamatory matter is 
communicated  . . .  to one other than the person defamed.”113 The 
contrary rule is the “single publication rule,” which views the tort 
of defamation as occurring in only one place—the place where the 
plaintiff suffers harm from defamation; the single publication rule 
is a rule that resembles the law of the place of a copyright owner’s 
domicile.114 In the United States, the Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws instructs courts to apply in defamation cases the 
law of the state of the plaintiff’s domicile if it was also a place of 
                                                                                                                            
109 See SILKE VON LEWINSKI, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND POLICY 7 (2008). 
110 Commentators have debated whether Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention is a 
choice-of-law provision. See e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, 
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE 129 (2010). 
111 Berne Convention, supra note 8, art. 5(2). 
112 David Rolph, Splendid Isolation? Australia as a Destination for “Libel Tourism”, 19 
AUSTL. INT’L L.J. 79, 85 (2012). 
113 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(1) (1965). 
114 See, e.g., David A. Anderson, Transnational Libel, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 71, 78 (2012). 
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publication.115 The rule operates alongside the “single publication 
rule,” which is formulated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
and also in the Uniform Single Publication Act,116 and which allows 
only one cause of action to be brought for publication that reaches 
multiple jurisdictions; the action then covers the entire harm 
caused by the publication.117 
A sign has emerged that the “single publication rule” (or the 
single place of harm rule) might be transferred to the realm of cop-
yright law as one court has recently indicated its willingness to lo-
calize the place of harm in the copyright owner’s domicile. The 
Court of Appeals of New York, in response to a question certified 
by the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in American 
Buddha,118 held that in a case of copyright infringement that oc-
curred on the Internet the location of the copyright owner’s injury 
was the residence or location of the principal place of business of 
the copyright holder.119 The Court of Appeals of New York opined 
that in the case of online infringement “identifying the situs of in-
jury is not as simple as turning to the place where plaintiff lost 
business because there is no singular location that fits that descrip-
tion,”120 and although the Court of Appeals did not explicitly so 
state, it seemed that the court might consider the place of the copy-
right owner (the copyright owner’s place of residence or its prin-
cipal place of business) to be the only place of injury in an online 
copyright infringement case. 
                                                                                                                            
115 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 150(2)–(3) (1971). If the domicile 
of the plaintiff and the place of publication do not coincide, courts will apply the law of 
the state or country with “the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the 
parties.” 
116 9C U.L.A. 173 (1952). 
117 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A(4) (1965). For a discussion of the 
“single publication rule” in the United Kingdom and Australia see, for example,  
MATTHEW COLLINS, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION AND THE INTERNET 346–47 (3d ed. 
2010). 
118 Penguin Grp. v. American Buddha, 921 N.Y.S.2d 171 (2011). 
119 Id. at 174. On the limitation of the holding to cases of uploading content on the 
Internet, see Troma Entm’t, Inc. v. Centennial Pictures Inc., 729 F.3d 215, 220 (2d Cir. 
2013) (declining to extend the holding in American Buddha to a case in which no 
uploading or making available on the Internet was alleged). 
120 American Buddha, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 176. 
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The New York Court of Appeals’ holding in American Buddha 
was limited to the localization of the injury for the purposes of per-
sonal jurisdiction (long-arm jurisdiction), thus subjecting the oper-
ation of the rule in the context of personal jurisdiction to the addi-
tional safeguards that the personal jurisdiction inquiry in the Unit-
ed States involves.121 On remand one of the additional safeguards 
(the requirement of substantial revenue drawn from interstate or 
international commerce) prevented the court in the copyright own-
er’s principal place of business from having personal jurisdiction.122 
The outcome in American Buddha was therefore consistent with 
the current US court practice (discussed later)123 of limiting per-
sonal jurisdiction in cases involving acts on the Internet.124 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) has al-
so attempted to pinpoint the place of injury on the Internet. In 
eDate and Martinez125 the CJEU ruled that a plaintiff in a case con-
cerning personality rights has the option of filing in a court of gen-
eral jurisdiction (as regards all damages caused) either in the place 
of the defendant (the publisher) or in the place “in which the cen-
tre of [the victim’s] interests is based.”126 Additionally, the plain-
tiff can sue in courts of specific jurisdiction (where “content placed 
online is or has been accessible”),127 but only as to the damage 
caused in the country of that court. Commentators questioned 
whether the approach that the CJEU adopted in the cases concern-
ing personality rights could also apply in cases of copyright in-
fringement on the Internet128 and open up the possibility of general 
jurisdiction in the place of the copyright owner’s domicile. A sub-
                                                                                                                            
121 Id. at 177. 
122 Penguin Grp. (USA), v. American Buddha, No. 09 CIV. 528 RA, 2013 WL 865486, 
*7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013). 
123 See infra Part III.B. 
124 Cf. American Buddha, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 176 (“[T]he absence of any evidence of the 
actual downloading of Penguin’s four works by users in New York is not fatal to a finding 
that the alleged injury occurred in New York.”). 
125 Joined Cases C-509/09 & C-161/10, eDate Adver. GmbH v. X; Martinez v. MGN 
Ltd., [2011] E.C.R. I-10269. 
126 Id. ¶ 1. 
127 Id.  
128 There is precedent for extending CJEU rulings concerning personality rights to 
copyright infringement cases. See Case C–68/93, Shevill v. Presse Alliance SA, 1995 
E.C.R. I–00415.  
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sequent CJEU decision in a trademark case129 did not answer the 
question for copyright cases; in Wintersteiger the CJEU ruled that 
the approach adopted for infringements of personality rights did 
not apply in cases concerning infringements of a registered trade-
mark.130 
Two CJEU cases have raised the issue of localization of copy-
right-infringing acts on the Internet. Pinckney, decided by the CJEU 
in 2013, concerned the sale of CDs on the Internet and confirmed 
that specific jurisdiction exists based on the accessibility of copy-
right infringing content on the Internet.131 In Pinckney, the jurisdic-
tion where the content was accessible also happened to be the do-
micile of the copyright owner; however, the CJEU rejected the 
proposition that the damage caused could be the sole basis for gen-
eral jurisdiction.132 In Hejduk,133 a case pending before the CJEU, 
the plaintiff is asking the CJEU to augment its Pinckney decision by 
recognizing that some damages on the Internet cannot be loca-
lized—such as the damages in the plaintiff’s case in which photo-
graphs were posted on the Internet without the plaintiff’s permis-
sion or a license134—and that a copyright owner should have the 
option, as a plaintiff does in a personality right suit under eDate, to 
bring a suit in the place of his own domicile for all damages caused. 
Whether the CJEU will depart from Pinckney for the purposes of 
damages that are not localizable remains to be seen; the Advocate 
General assigned to the case recommended that there not be an 
extension of the eDate approach to copyright.135 
Even if the place of the copyright owner’s domicile is consi-
dered to be the place of injury for purposes of jurisdictional analy-
sis, and even if courts in that place are allowed to serve as courts of 
general jurisdiction, this result does not automatically mean that 
                                                                                                                            
129 Case C-523/10, Wintersteiger AG v. Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH, 
2012 E.C.R. 90. 
130 Id. ¶ 24. The trademark owner can sue in the country of the trademark registration 
or in the place of the defendant’s domicile. 
131 Case C-170/12, Pinckney v. KDG Mediatech AG, 2013 E.C.R. 400  ¶ 45, 45. 
132 Id. 
133 Case C-441/13, Hejduk v. EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH, 2014 E.C.R. ¶ 2212 16, 
(opinion of AG Villalón). 
134 Id. 
135 Id. ¶ 27. 
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the courts would apply a single law—the law of the copyright own-
er’s domicile—to infringements in multiple countries. EU choice-
of-law rules instruct courts in the EU to apply “the law of the 
country for which protection is claimed”;136 US courts will apply 
the law of the country with “the most significant relationship to the 
occurrence and the parties.”137 Arguably, both of these rules could 
be interpreted in a manner that would allow for the application of 
the law of the country of the copyright owner’s domicile; protec-
tion could be claimed for the country of the copyright owner, which 
could also be deemed the country with the most significant rela-
tionship to the infringement and the parties. But neither rule sug-
gests that a court must apply a single copyright law to infringe-
ments worldwide. 
B. Factors Approach 
Under the factors approach, courts determine applicable law by 
weighing multiple factors;138 the approach was developed in re-
sponse to criticism of rigid choice-of-law rules, such as lex loci delic-
ti. The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws adopted this ap-
proach139 but US courts have not applied the approach to copyright 
infringements, resorting instead to the traditional lex loci delicti 
rule.140 However, two sets of proposed principles for conflict-of-
laws rules in IP cases—the ALI Principles141 and the CLIP Prin-
ciples142—suggest that courts follow a factors approach in cases of 
                                                                                                                            
136 Regulation 864/2007, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 
on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (Rome II), 2007 O.J. (L 199) art. 
8(1) [hereinafter Rome II Regulation]. 
137 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(1) (1971). 
138 Other rules may involve multiple factors but not their weighing. See supra note 82 
and accompanying text for the rule proposed by Jane Ginsburg that involves multiple 
factors that affect the choice of applicable law but does not require a court to weigh the 
factors. 
139 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971). 
140 Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 
1998) (“On infringement issues, the governing conflicts principle is usually lex loci delicti, 
the doctrine generally applicable to torts.”). 
141 The American Law Institute’s Intellectual Property: Principles Governing Jurisdiction, 
Choice of Law, and Judgments in Transnational Disputes were adopted and promulgated in 
2007. See ALI Principles, supra note 66. 
142 The Max Planck Institute Group on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property 
published its Principles (the “CLIP Principles”) in 2013. See CLIP PRINCIPLES, supra note 
38. 
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copyright infringement and use the approach to narrow the number 
of applicable copyright laws in cases of infringements occurring in 
multiple countries.143 In addition to the two sets of principles, 
another proposal could imply some weighing of various factors in 
searching for a single applicable copyright law: Paul Geller’s pro-
posal, articulated in his articles from 1996 and 2000,144 suggested 
that the focus of the choice-of-law analysis be on “consequences 
for judicial remedies”145 and lead to the application of the law of 
the “country of the targeted market.”146 In some instances the 
identification of the country of the targeted market would require a 
weighing of several factors. 
The ALI and CLIP principles include special provisions that 
apply to infringements on the Internet, and the application of the 
provisions can lead to a single copyright law applying to acts on the 
Internet.147 Although the drafters of both sets of principles de-
signed the special provisions to concern ubiquitous environments 
in general, it is clear that if adopted, the special provisions would 
apply primarily on the Internet:148 The comment to the ALI Prin-
ciples’ provision concerning choice of law in “cases of ubiquitous 
infringement” lists “distribution of a work on the Internet” as the 
only example.149 A comment on the CLIP Principles’ provision ex-
plains that the provision was motivated by situations that arise on 
                                                                                                                            
143 Because the focus of this Article is on the problem of the multiplicity of copyright 
laws on the Internet, this section analyzes only the provisions of the proposals that pertain 
to the solutions to the multiplicity problem. However, it should be noted that by 
providing principles for jurisdiction, choice of law, and the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments, the proposals present coherent conflict-of-laws systems with their 
own sophisticated internal consistency, and therefore an analysis of any individual 
provision of the proposals must take into consideration the entire system in which the 
provision ought to operate. For a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the ubiquitous 
infringement provisions of the two sets of principles see MATULIONYTĖ, supra note 7, at 
166–202. 
144 Geller, supra note 67, at 125. For a critique of Geller’s proposal from 1996, see 
Reindl, supra note 2, at 815–18. 
145 Geller, supra note 67, at 125. 
146 Id. at 129. 
147 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 66, § 321 (“Law or Laws to Be Applied in Cases of 
Ubiquitous Infringement”); CLIP PRINCIPLES, supra note 38, at art. 3:603(1). 
148 “[The term ‘ubiquitous’] is clearly expected to cover Internet infringements.” 
MATULIONYTĖ, supra note 7, at 178. 
149 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 66, § 321 cmt. a. 
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the Internet;150 another comment lists the Internet as the only ex-
ample of ubiquitous media to which the provision applies,151 and a 
note to the provision explains that the Principles adopt a narrow 
definition of “ubiquitousness” that very likely results in the special 
“ubiquitous infringement” provision applying if not only to than 
certainly primarily to online cases.152 
The special provision of the ALI Principles directs courts to 
apply the “law or laws of the State or States with close connections 
to the dispute” and provides a demonstrative list of factors that 
may be considered to determine the close connections: the place of 
residence of the parties, the center of the parties’ relationship, the 
“extent of the activities and the investment of parties,” and “the 
principal markets toward which the parties directed their activi-
ties.”153 A comment on the provision explains that the choice of 
factors reflects that the purpose of IP rights is “to create incentives 
to innovate”154 and that the factors should therefore lead to the 
countries “most closely connected to that objective.”155 The focus 
on the center of the parties’ relationship, if a relationship between 
the parties exists, is justified by the need for legal certainty and the 
preference for parties’ ability to predict the law applicable to IP 
rights when they enter the relationship.156 
The special provision of the CLIP Principles also calls for the 
application of the “law of the State having the closest connection 
with the infringement” in cases of “ubiquitous infringement.”157 
The examples of the factors that a court should consider in deter-
mining the state with the closest connection are the “infringer’s 
habitual residence,” “the infringer’s principal place of business,” 
“the place where substantial activities in furtherance of the in-
fringement in its entirety have been carried out,” and “the place 
                                                                                                                            
150 The provision is “motivated by the attempt to balance the interest in efficient 
enforcement in the volatile environment of digital media with the need to offer safeguards 
to ensure that alleged infringers’ rights are not substantially curtailed.” CLIP PRINCIPLES, 
supra note 38, at art. 3:603 cmt. 3:603.C02. 
151 Id. at art. 3:603 cmt. 3:603.C09. 
152 Id. at art. 3:603 n.3:603.N19. 
153 Id. 
154 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 66, § 321 cmt. a. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 CLIP PRINCIPLES, supra note 38, at art 3:603(2). 
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where the harm caused by the infringement is substantial in rela-
tion to the infringement in its entirety.”158 
The special provisions in both the ALI and CLIP Principles in-
clude an escape clause that provides for the possibility of a carve-
out from the application of the selected applicable law or laws; the 
escape clause allows the parties to prove for any country covered 
by the action that the law in that country differs from the selected 
law.159 Under the ALI Principles, if a party proves the differences, 
“[t]he court shall take into account such differences in determining 
the scope of liability and remedies.”160 Under the CLIP Principles, 
if a party proves that “the rules applying in a State or States cov-
ered by the dispute differ from the law applicable to the dispute in 
aspects which are essential for the decision,” “the court shall apply 
the different national laws unless this leads to inconsistent results, 
in which case the differences should be taken into account in fa-
shioning the remedy.”161 
In addition to limiting the number of countries whose laws ap-
ply, the principles also aim to limit the number of countries in 
which an Internet actor can be brought to court. While both sets of 
principles recognize the general jurisdiction of certain courts, they 
limit the courts that have specific jurisdiction over the alleged in-
fringer. The ALI Principles limit specific jurisdiction (the jurisdic-
tion of the court of the “State in which the  . . .  activities give rise 
to an infringement claim”162 and the state of which the defendant is 
not a resident) to cases in which the alleged infringer “directed 
those activities to that State.”163 The CLIP Principles limit specific 
jurisdiction in a similar manner; an alleged infringer cannot be sued 
in a court of a state when “he has not acted in that State to initiate 
                                                                                                                            
158 Id. 
159 For a detailed analysis of the escape clauses in the Proposals see MATULIONYTĖ, 
supra note 7, at 183–86. 
160 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 66, § 321(2). 
161 CLIP PRINCIPLES, supra note 38, at art. 3:603(3). 
162 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 66, § 204(2). 
163 Id. § 204(2). The commentary first explains that the rule applies an objective 
standard (“[t]he question is whether it is reasonable to conclude from the defendant’s 
behavior that defendant sought to enjoy the benefits of engaging with the forum”) and 
then the commentary provides examples of facts that may evidence the defendant’s 
directing his acts at the forum. See id. § 204 & cmt. 
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or further the infringement and her or his activity cannot reasona-
bly be seen as having been directed to that State.”164 
While they limit instances of specific jurisdiction, the principles 
expand the scope of jurisdiction of some courts with specific juris-
diction by allowing the courts, in some very limited circumstances, 
to decide infringements that the alleged infringer committed any-
where in the world, not only in the countries where the courts sit. 
The ALI Principles provide an exception in cases where there is no 
WTO member state (membership in the WTO ensures a certain 
level of copyright protection)165 in which general jurisdiction over 
an alleged infringer can be established. In such cases the ALI Prin-
ciples allow a court with specific jurisdiction to decide claims with-
out territorial limitations if the alleged infringer “directed his activ-
ities to that State,” and the alleged infringer “solicits or maintains 
contacts, business, or an audience in that State on a regular basis, 
whether or not such activity initiates or furthers the infringing ac-
tivity.”166 The CLIP Principles make an exception to the territorial 
limitation on specific jurisdiction in instances in which the infring-
ing activity has no substantial effect in a state where general juris-
diction over the alleged infringer exists; in such instances, a court 
with specific jurisdiction may also decide infringements in coun-
tries other than the court’s country, if the “substantial activities in 
furtherance of the infringement” were performed entirely in the 
court’s country or the harm caused there is “substantial in relation 
to the infringement in its entirety.”167 
The factors approach should be the champion of promoting the 
“right” copyright policies; by selecting particular factors for courts 
to weigh the approach’s designers steered the choice of applicable 
law toward the law of the country that in a given case has the pre-
vailing interest in having its copyright law applied, or alternative-
ly—in the words of the comparative impairment analysis—the 
country whose interests would be more impaired if its law were not 
                                                                                                                            
164 CLIP PRINCIPLES, supra note 38, at art. 2:202. The targeting approach to the 
limitation of personal jurisdiction is consistent with court practices in a number of 
countries, as discussed infra in Part III.B. 
165 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8. 
166 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 66, § 204(3). 
167 CLIP PRINCIPLES, supra note 38, at art. 2:203. 
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applied.168 It can be debated whether the results are different when 
courts use the factors approach instead of rigid rules based on loca-
lization.169 Critics of the localization approach argue that when ap-
plying localization-based rules courts often use escape devices, 
such as creative assessments of the location of an infringing act, to 
achieve the application of the law of the country that best reflects 
the courts’ own policy preferences.170 For these critics, factors ap-
proaches merely legitimize the outcomes of the courts’ actual deci-
sion-making processes.171 
The two sets of Principles explored in this section show differ-
ent policy emphases.172 The ALI Principles emphasize that the 
choice of applicable law provides legal certainty for parties with a 
pre-existing relationship;173 when such a relationship is absent, as is 
typical in infringement cases, the choice of law under the ALI Prin-
ciples should promote the policy of creating incentives to inno-
vate.174 The emphasis on incentives to innovate (or create) reflects 
the common-law utilitarian notion of copyright as expressed in the 
IP clause of the US Constitution, according to which copyright 
should “promote the progress of science and useful arts.”175 
The CLIP Principles do not declare a preference for a law that 
provides the most effective incentives to create, which is unders-
                                                                                                                            
168 On the attempts to draft choice-of-law rules or factors in a policy-neutral fashion see 
generally Trimble, supra note 8. 
169 Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in Cross-Border Torts: Why Plaintiffs Win and 
Should, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 337, 380 (2012) (showing that “[t]he [studied] cases [decided 
by courts that have abandoned the lex loci delicti rule] are almost evenly split  . . .  
between applying the law of the place of conduct and the law of the place of injury.”). 
170 See id. at 381 (comparing how the decisions by courts that have abandoned the lex 
loci delicti rule would have been different “[i]f the  . . .  cases had been decided under the 
traditional lex loci delicti rule.”). 
171 “[R]esult-selectivity is an integral element of the positive conflict of laws and that 
recognition of the need for sound outcomes in multistate cases is growing, especially in 
areas that have been the subject of important domestic reforms, such as family and tort 
law. Openly or covertly, the better law principle now permeates case law, statutes and 
conventions.” FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 191 
(1993). 
172 See supra notes 144 & 145 and accompanying text (detailing Paul Geller’s preference 
for effective enforcement, which translates into his approach’s focus on the 
“consequences for judicial remedies”). 
173 See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 66, § 321 cmt. a. 
174 Id. 
175 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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tandable given the provenance of the CLIP Principles and also giv-
en their authors’ desire to present a set of principles that would be 
universally acceptable to countries with varying IP philosophies. 
Although the CLIP Principles list choice-of-law factors only de-
monstratively, and they count on courts to apply other or addition-
al factors as they deem fit, the factors that the authors selected as 
examples are indicative of certain policy preferences. Three of the 
listed factors concentrate on the infringer’s domicile and the place 
of the “substantial activities” of the infringer,176 and therefore the 
factors resemble the rule that localizes the infringement in the 
place of the alleged infringing activity’s origin.177 Their selection of 
the factors leaves the impression that the CLIP Principles’ drafters 
give preference to the law of the country that has an interest in re-
gulating the alleged infringer’s conduct. However, the Principles 
list the three factors only as examples and add a fourth factor point-
ing to the place of harm, meaning that courts could still apply the 
law of another country as long as it is the law with the “closest 
connection with the infringement”;178 in this manner the Principles 
presumably allow sufficient leeway for courts to instill in their 
choice-of-law analyses the IP philosophy of their particular jurisdic-
tion. 
While at least in theory it assists the promotion of the “right” 
policy, the factors approach seems to be detrimental to legal cer-
tainty. The localization approach, of course, may share this flaw; 
localization in the place of the copyright owner and localization in 
the place of the alleged infringing activity’s origin present their 
own pitfalls for legal certainty.179 However, the factors approach 
involves even greater uncertainty because the choice of law de-
pends on the weighing of factors that will necessarily reflect the 
subjective assessments and preferences of individual adjudicating 
courts. Critics of the localization approach may argue that legal cer-
tainty is not in any more jeopardy under the factors approach than 
it is under the localization approach; the critics may contend that 
the localization approach, combined with various escape devices, 
                                                                                                                            
176 CLIP PRINCIPLES, supra note 38, at art. 3:603(2). 
177 See supra Part II.A.1. 
178 CLIP PRINCIPLES, supra note 38, at art. 3:603(2). 
179 See supra Part II.A.1 & II.A.2. 
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provides as much flexibility for a court’s choice-of-law analysis as 
does the factors approach. 
Because the choice of applicable law will be case-specific and 
dependent on courts’ individual assessments, it should be difficult 
to predict the alignment of either of the Principles with the rules of 
personal jurisdiction. However, if the factors for choice of law re-
flect many of the same facts and occurrences that influence the re-
sults of the personal jurisdiction analysis,180 it is very likely that the 
outcome of the choice-of-law analysis will align well with the appli-
cation of the rules of personal jurisdiction. A court of general juris-
diction that follows the ALI Principles can easily locate “close 
connections to the dispute” in the country of the alleged infring-
er,181 which will allow the court to choose its own law as applicable 
to all infringements. A court with specific jurisdiction based on the 
alleged infringer’s activities directed at the country that gave rise to 
an infringement claim182 will be able to apply its own law to in-
fringements occurring in its country because the court will identify 
close connections based on the infringer’s activities directed at its 
country.183 Even in the exceptional cases in which the ALI Prin-
ciples allow a court of specific jurisdiction to decide claims arising 
anywhere in the world the court could legitimately apply its own 
country’s law.184 Choice-of-law analyses in courts of general and 
specific jurisdiction applying the CLIP Principles would likely have 
the same outcomes;185 if courts use the CLIP Principles they will 
also likely apply the law with which they are most familiar—the 
forum law. 
                                                                                                                            
180 See Th. M. De Boer, Facultative Choice of Law: The Procedural Status of Choice-of-Law 
Rules and Foreign Law, in COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 393–94 (1997) (discussing the “co-ordination—or rather 
subordination” of the choice of law to the choice of jurisdiction). 
181 See CLIP PRINCIPLES, supra note 38, at art. 3:603.N19–20 (explaining that the factors 
that will play a role in the choice will be the place of residence of the parties and the 
extent of the parties’ activities and investment). 
182 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 66, § 204(2). 
183 See CLIP PRINCIPLES, supra note 38, at art. 3:603.N19–20. 
184 See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 66, § 204(3). 
185 See supra notes 157 & 158 and accompanying text (on the CLIP Principles’ choice-of-
law rules), note 164 (on the CLIP Principles’ limitation of specific jurisdiction), and note 
167 (on the CLIP Principles’ exception to the territorial limitation on specific 
jurisdiction). 
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Finally, factors approaches are not immune to the same criti-
cism that pertains to the localization approaches: problems with 
localizing facts and occurrences on the Internet.186 However, loca-
lization problems—to the extent that they do arise—should be less 
detrimental to the factors approach than they are to the localization 
approach; while the localization approach relies entirely on the lo-
calization of a single fact or occurrence, the factors approach uses 
the location of several facts or occurrences.187 Additionally, as 
noted earlier, concerns about localization may be waning in light of 
technological developments.188 
C. Copyright Infringement as a Single-Place Tort 
The primary hurdle for the proposed conflict-of-laws solutions 
to the multiplicity problem is countries’ aversion to the notion of 
copyright infringement as a single-place tort, i.e., a tort that is per-
ceived to have occurred (or to be centered) in one place and ame-
nable to adjudication under a single country’s law notwithstanding 
the fact that it has effects in other countries.189 An example of a 
single-place tort subject to one country’s applicable law is a car ac-
cident. Although the interests of multiple countries may be impli-
cated (e.g., parties from countries A and B collide in country C 
while driving cars manufactured in countries D and E), a court will 
choose and apply a single country’s law to adjudicate the tort even 
if the tort’s effects arise in multiple countries (e.g., the parties’ in-
                                                                                                                            
186 See supra notes 92–100 and accompanying text. 
187 Even localization approaches may offer alternatives to particular places that courts 
cannot localize—for instance, some jurisdictions may enable courts to localize domicile in 
multiple places (e.g., general jurisdiction over businesses and legal entities), and courts 
can accept various acts to determine the location of the infringing activity (e.g., in cases of 
sales on the Internet courts may select multiple places as places of infringement). See, e.g., 
Brussels I Regulation (recast), supra note 61, at art. 63 (providing three possible 
definitions of a domicile of “a company or other legal person or association of natural or 
legal persons”). 
188 See supra notes 99 and 100 and accompanying text. 
189 It is important to remember that “copyright infringement” in this context describes 
a single act resulting in the violation of the laws of multiple countries. For example, the 
posting of a work on the Internet may be, depending on the country, the infringing act of 
making available to the public, and/or public performance, and/or public display. For the 
difference between a multi-place tort and a multiple tort, see MIREILLE VAN EECHOUD, 
CHOICE OF LAW IN COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS 216 (2003) (explaining how a 
situation can be regarded both as a multi-local tort and a multiple tort). 
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juries were treated in countries A, B, and C, and the parties in-
curred additional costs associated with the accident in countries A 
and B, such as the repair or replacement of their cars).190 
As opposed to negligence leading to a car accident or the inten-
tional tort of battery, which are single-place torts, copyright in-
fringement is traditionally a multi-place tort;191 if an act causes ef-
fects in multiple countries, the law of each country where the ef-
fects accrued—where copyrights under the countries’ laws were 
infringed—applies to the act (or its effects) within that country. As 
opposed to the car accident and battery, which create an obligation 
considered to have vested in a single place (in a single country), an 
act of copyright infringement causes harm in multiple places (coun-
tries) and creates obligations in each of the multiple countries. On-
ly if countries were to agree to re-conceptualize copyright in-
fringement as a single-place tort could the conflict-of-laws solu-
tions in the previous sections succeed; only then could courts 
choose and apply one country’s law to acts of copyright infringe-
ment with effects everywhere and decide remedies for the harm 
suffered everywhere. 
The reason commentators give for copyright infringement be-
ing a multi-place tort is that the principle of territoriality so dic-
tates. Under the territoriality principle a country’s copyright law 
governs copyright matters only within the reach of the country’s 
prescriptive jurisdiction.192 This principle does not distinguish 
copyright law from other types of national laws—including general 
tort laws—which typically also do not reach beyond a country’s 
own prescriptive jurisdiction. What makes copyright law different 
from other types of national laws is that it creates an intangible ob-
ject of property that, because of the principle of territoriality, ex-
tends everywhere within the reach of an individual country’s pre-
                                                                                                                            
190 More than one country’s law may apply in the case if the court uses depeçage and 
applies different countries’ laws to certain acts and facts. However, each time it will be 
only one country’s law that will apply to any given act and fact. 
191 Another term used to describe this characteristic is “multi-local tort.” See VAN 
EECHOUD, supra note 189, at 215. 
192 PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, 
LAW, AND PRACTICE 99 (2013); see also Trimble, supra note 8 (discussing the difference 
between the reach of a country’s prescriptive jurisdiction and the effective territorial 
scope of the country’s substantive laws). 
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scriptive jurisdiction; copyright thus operates as a piece of virtual 
immovable property193 that stretches across the entire territory of 
the country’s prescriptive jurisdiction.194 Just as courts under tradi-
tional choice-of-law rules have applied the law of the country of the 
place of immovable property (lex rei sitae) in cases of torts that 
caused injury to the property,195 so have courts applied the law of 
the protecting country—the law that created the violated copyright 
at issue and thus where the copyright was infringed—to copyright 
infringements. Consistently with the view that copyright was akin 
to immovable property, courts also considered copyright infringe-
ment to be a local and not a transitory cause of action, and there-
fore they refused to adjudicate copyright infringement claims aris-
ing under foreign laws.196 
There are two problems with using the traditional choice-of-law 
rule for immovable property in cases involving copyright. The first 
problem is that, because of its intangible nature and its internation-
al harmonization, copyright as an object of property typically exists 
simultaneously in multiple countries. While a few pieces of immov-
able property might stretch across a national border (and very few 
might extend over two national borders) and therefore two (or 
three) countries’ laws might apply to the property, copyright as an 
object of property almost always exists simultaneously in multiple 
countries. Not surprisingly the rule designed for immovable prop-
erty does not function well under the conditions of a multiplicity of 
possibly applicable laws that typically arise in cases of copyright 
infringements on the Internet. The second problem is that choice-
of-law rules concerning immovable property have evolved: courts 
have accepted the proposition that certain tort claims concerning 
                                                                                                                            
193 Cf. Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack, [2014] BCSC 1063, ¶ 26 (Can.) (“The plaintiffs’ 
intellectual property at the heart of the underlying action is movable property.”). 
194 Cf. 3 MELVIN B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.01[C] 
(“[A] copyright  . . .  has no situs apart from the domicile of its proprietor.”); James Y. 
Stern, Property, Exclusivity, and Jurisdiction, 100 VA. L. REV. 111, 170–71 (2014) (“[I]n a 
sense, one may say [copyright and patent] are governed by a situs rule, and their situs is 
federal territory.”). 
195 See 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 609 (8th ed. 2001); 
G.C. CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 1199 (14th ed. 2008). 
196 See, e.g., Peter D. Trooboff, Intellectual Property, in TRANSNATIONAL TORT 
LITIGATION: JURISDICTIONAL PRINCIPLES 125 (Campbell McLachlan & Peter Nygh eds., 
1996). 
2015] A MULTIPLICITY OF COPYRIGHT LAWS 385 
immovable property are transitory causes of action,197 and modern 
choice-of-law approaches have departed from the traditional strict 
lex rei sitae rule for some claims involving immovable property.198 
Some relaxation of the rules has also occurred for copyright, al-
though the relaxation happened later for copyright than it did for 
immovable property.199 First, some courts have accepted the notion 
that copyright infringement is a transitory cause of action. In 1984 
in London Film the US District Court for the Southern District of 
New York found that it had jurisdiction over claims of copyright 
infringement that arose under the copyright laws of foreign coun-
tries.200 The UK Supreme Court cited London Film for its finding 
in its 2011 Lucasfilm judgment that copyright is a transitory cause 
of action in England.201 Second, some countries have undertaken 
small departures from the dictate of lex loci protectionis—the copy-
right version of lex rei sitae: new acts on private international law in 
China and Switzerland now allow parties to a copyright infringe-
ment dispute to agree (after an occurrence of infringement) on the 
law applicable to the infringement.202 Finally, countries have re-
cently agreed to recognize, in limited circumstances, the status of a 
work or a copy of a work based on a foreign country’s law. The 
2012 EU Orphan Works Directive203 provides for mutual recogni-
tion of the orphan work status in all EU member countries once the 
                                                                                                                            
197 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 87 (1971); see also, e.g., 
Stephen Lee, Title to Foreign Real Property in Transnational Money Claims, 32 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 607, 641–57 (1995) (analyzing ways in which tort claims involving 
immovable property can be reframed to become transitory causes of action). 
198 E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 147 (1971); Rome II 
Regulation, supra note 136, at art. 4(3), 7. 
199 See also Rita Matulionytė, Calling for Party Autonomy in Intellectual Property 
Infringement Cases, 9 J. PRIVATE INT’L L. 77, 84 (2013). 
200 London Film Productions Ltd. v. Intercontinental Communications, Inc., 580 F. 
Supp. 47, 48–50 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); see also Creative Technology Ltd. v. Aztech Sys. PTE,  
61 F.3d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 1995). 
201 Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Ainsworth, [2011] UKSC 39, ¶ 84, 109. 
202 BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DAS INTERNATIONALE PRIVATRECHT [IPRG] [PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW] Dec. 18, 1987, as amended July 1, 2013, art 110(2) (Switz.); Law of 
the Application of Law for Foreign-Related Civil Relations of the People’s Republic of 
China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2010, 
effective April 1, 2011), art. 50. But cf. Rome II Regulation, supra note 136, at art. 8(3) 
(prohibiting an agreement from derogating from the applicable law selected). 
203 Council Directive 2012/28, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
October 2012 on Certain Permitted Uses of Orphan Works, 2012 O.J. (L 299) 5. 
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status is established for a work in one of the EU member coun-
tries.204 The 2013 Marrakesh Treaty205 provides for cross-border 
exchange of “accessible format copies”206 for use by the visually 
impaired,207 and while the Treaty does not use the words “mutual 
recognition,” it seems that the system of exchange implies a mu-
tual recognition of the copies’ status as established in other coun-
tries-parties to the Treaty.208 
Some critics may doubt the importance of these developments 
for advancing the relaxation of choice-of-law rules in copyright. 
William Patry considers London Film an erroneous decision and 
charges that “[i]t is completely wrong to assert that copyright is a 
transitory tort.”209 He notes that UK courts have been influenced 
by the EU rules that, consistent with civil law practice, allow juris-
diction (competence) over copyright infringements arising under 
other countries’ laws.210 The UK Supreme Court decision in Lu-
casfilm could indeed be interpreted as a natural consequence of UK 
membership in the EU and a reflection of the influence of EU rules 
on the English legal system. While the acceptance of copyright in-
fringement as a transitory cause of action can be viewed as an im-
portant step in the departure from the rules that resemble rules on 
immovable property, the fact that copyright infringement is a tran-
sitory cause of action does not mean that the choice-of-law rule go-
verning copyright infringement will automatically change from lex 
loci protectionis. Allowing parties to select the law applicable to in-
fringement, as the Chinese and the Swiss acts do, could be critical-
ly viewed as no more than a move to extend a concept familiar in 
arbitration to the civil litigation realm.211 Finally, the importance of 
the EU Orphan Works Directive and the Marrakesh Treaty as mi-
                                                                                                                            
204 Id. at art. 4. 
205 Marrakesh Treaty, supra note 47. 
206 Id. at art. 2(b). 
207 Id. at art. 5. 
208 See generally Marketa Trimble, The Marrakesh Puzzle, 45 IIC 768 (2014) (analyzing 
the Treaty and discussing possible implementation tools to help executive and legislative 
experts implementing the Treaty). 
209 7 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 25:105 (2013). 
210 See id. 
211 See also infra Part III.A for a discussion of choice-of-law practice and the possibility 
that parties to a dispute will not invoke or plead foreign law, thereby agreeing de facto on 
the forum law. 
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lestones in the process of changing views on choice of law in copy-
right could also be questioned; the two instruments do not state 
explicitly that they seek to influence choice-of-law rules, and they 
provide for mutual recognition in very limited and arguably highly 
harmonized spheres. 
Notwithstanding these objections the developments described 
above can be taken to be signs of a trend towards relaxation of 
choice-of-law rules for copyright; the developments are emerging 
while there is a need for more efficient cross-border enforcement 
and a desire for easier and less costly cross-border transactions. As 
Graeme Austin predicted, the desiderata will play important roles 
as countries decide whether to change choice of law for copyright 
infringements, particularly as they face the additional multiplicity 
problem challenges on the Internet.212 If the developments con-
cerning immovable property teach a lesson, it seems that another 
development is necessary to convince countries to relax choice-of-
law rules for copyright infringements: countries would need to re-
linquish their paternalistic approach to copyright in order to accept 
the concept of copyright infringement as a single-place tort.213 
                                                                                                                            
212 Austin, supra note 7, at 582 (cautioning that “[d]evising a conflict of laws regime for 
cyberspace copyright infringement needs to be seen as a task that involves an important 
social policy choice, one that requires weighing the advantages of single governing law 
approaches—such as more efficient enforcement and licensing of copyrights—against the 
costs of allowing domestic copyright laws to be overridden by the copyright laws of other 
nations”). 
213 See June F. Entman, Abolishing Local Action Rules: A First Step Toward Modernizing 
Jurisdiction and Venue in Tennessee, 34 U. MEM. L. REV. 251, 260 (2004) (“In addition to, 
and perhaps underlying, nineteenth century notions of state court territorial jurisdiction, 
courts may have feared loss of local control and ensuing confusion in land titles if 
judgments were permitted to directly affect land titles in other states. Insistence upon a 
state’s exclusive power to dispense remedies respecting land within its borders provided 
the states with protection from sister state adjudications that refused to apply, or 
misapplied, situs law.”); Richard Fentiman, Choice of Law and Intellectual Property, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW – HEADING FOR THE 
FUTURE 129, 148 (Josef Drexl & Annette Kur eds., 2005) (“The character of rights in 
intellectual property as state-protected rights, which are both exclusive and economically 
sensitive, gives the law in this area a regulatory character, and ensures that every state has 
a legitimate interest in the protection of intellectual property rights according to its 
laws.”); Graeme W. Austin, Copyright Across (and Within) Domestic Borders, in 
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW WORLD 105, 115 
(Charles E.F. Rickett & Graeme W. Austin eds., 2000) (“The development of private 
international law theories that seek to loosen the connection between copyright and the 
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For copyright infringement to be treated as a single-place tort, 
with the result that a single country’s law could apply to the in-
fringement worldwide, it would be necessary for countries to con-
sent to have their copyright policies yield, from time to time, to the 
copyright policies of other countries. Countries’ objection will be 
that copyright policies embed a particular balance of fundamental 
rights that countries must not allow to be endangered by permitting 
foreign copyright laws to apply. A counter-argument might be that 
other laws that apply to single-place torts also reflect fundamental 
rights and that it is the public policy exception that provides an es-
cape valve that in conflict of laws (both in choice of law and the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments) protects 
fundamental rights.214 
Countries may also hesitate to accept the notion of copyright 
infringement as a single-place tort because they might be 
concerned about enforcement of judgments that would be based on 
a single country’s applicable law. This is a concern that countries 
share for immovable property; the concern has been one of the 
rationales for the local action doctrine, which prevented a court 
from issuing a judgment that the court could not enforce because 
the court lacked physical power over the immovable property.215 
The concern is certainly warranted in cases of registered 
intellectual property rights that require a registration by a 
country’s agency for their existence. There should be less reason 
for this concern in cases of unregistered intellectual property 
rights, such as copyright.216 
                                                                                                                            
nation state also have much in common with the shift towards the privatisation of 
copyright regulation through the institution of contract.”). 
214 Critics could argue that the issues in which countries’ copyright laws differ are often 
(if not always) precisely those issues that countries cannot harmonize (at all or more 
deeply) because the issues reflect differences in the countries’ notions of fundamental 
rights. The practice would have to show whether any space remains for issues that are not 
yet fully harmonized but that do not exhibit a friction of fundamental rights, meaning a 
space in which no harmonization (or no deeper harmonization) has occurred but a space 
in which countries are willing to recognize and enforce foreign judgments based on a 
foreign country’s law that differs from their own. 
215 Fisher v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 243 F. Supp. 2d 538, 547 (E.D. Va. 2003). 
216 Under the Berne Convention, countries must require no formalities for copyright 
protection. See Berne Convention, supra note 8, at art. 5(2). 
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One case, Viewfinder,217 suggests that the concern about 
enforcement might be justified in copyright cases; in Viewfinder a 
French court applied the law of a single country—France—to 
copyright infringement that arguably could have been claimed to 
have occurred in multiple countries simultaneously, including in 
the United States.218 While the French court did not explicitly 
apply French law to acts that had occurred in the United States, its 
judgment de facto did apply French law to acts in the United States 
because the posting of the photographs at issue on a website had 
occurred in the United States and the injunction that the French 
court granted based on French law was therefore directed at 
activities in the United States. The plaintiff sought to have the 
resulting French judgment recognized in the United States and 
enforced against US defendants; however, the US Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the public policy 
exception prevented the recognition of the judgment in the United 
States if the cause of action would violate the First Amendment.219 
The outcome in Viewfinder can be interpreted as confirming 
countries’ concerns about treating copyright as a single-place tort 
and facing the resulting enforcement difficulties; however, the 
outcome can also be interpreted as proving that the public policy 
exception is an effective escape valve for the protection of 
fundamental rights and other significant public policies. The 
existence of the exception should make it easier for countries to 
accept copyright infringement as a single-place tort while assuring 
countries that they will not have to compromise their fundamental 
rights. 
The degree of harmonization of copyright law at the 
international level (with respect to both scope and depth, and the 
number of countries with harmonized copyright laws) should en-
hance countries’ amenability to shifting to copyright infringement 
as a single-place tort.220 The more that copyright laws are harmo-
nized, the fewer will be the differences that will persist in the poli-
                                                                                                                            
217 Sarl Louis Feraud Int’l v. Viewfinder, Inc., 489 F.3d 474 (2d Cir. 2007). 
218 Id. at 477. 
219 Id. at 481. 
220 Countries’ willingness to relax lex rei sitae in cases of environmental torts may be 
influenced by a high degree of environmental law harmonization in the countries. See 
Rome II Regulation, supra note 136, at art. 7. 
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cies that countries promote and the less it will be that countries will 
be concerned that foreign law might apply in some cases. While 
copyright law might not soon reach a sufficiently deep global har-
monization that would lead to a single global copyright standard 
(the standard that some commentators have seen as a promising 
solution to the multiplicity problem),221 the law could much sooner 
reach a level of harmonization that would make countries comfort-
able with a shift to the notion of copyright infringement as a single-
place tort. 
Finally, some critics might argue that conflict-of-laws ap-
proaches would lead to a result that is worse than a single global 
copyright solution because the approaches allow one country to 
dictate copyright law for other countries without allowing the other 
countries to shape the law.222 It is important to remember though, 
that as opposed to the single global copyright law approaches, con-
flict-of-laws approaches affect only cross-border scenarios; domes-
tic scenarios continue to be governed by the national laws of indi-
vidual countries. Comity should ensure that countries will see their 
laws applied whenever there is a legitimate reason for the laws to 
apply, and the public policy exception safeguards fundamental 
rights and other significant public policies. 
III. REALITIES AFFECTING THE MULTIPLICITY OF 
COPYRIGHT LAWS ON THE INTERNET 
The existing proposals that attempt to address the multiplicity 
of copyright laws on the Internet have not found their way into na-
tional legislation or international treaties, but some courts have al-
ready looked at the proposals when deciding cases involving the 
multiplicity problem and have benefited from the wealth of analysis 
that the proposals include.223 However, unless major changes in 
conflict of laws are undertaken by all or a significant number of 
countries in concert, Internet actors will continue to face the mul-
tiplicity problem. 
                                                                                                                            
221 See supra Part I.B. 
222 See supra Part I.A (discussing countries’ involvement in shaping international law). 
223 See supra note 30 (referring to court decisions that cited the ALI and CLIP 
Principles). 
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Commentators have predicted that the multiplicity problem 
would be a major hurdle for activities on the Internet, but a cursory 
review of copyright cases from the past two decades suggests that 
the multiplicity threat has not materialized, at least not in the form 
of Internet actors facing global enforcement campaigns pursued 
simultaneously under the laws of all countries connected to the In-
ternet. The reasons that Internet actors are not being exposed to 
global copyright litigation mayhem dwell in the realities of cross-
border copyright litigation, which limit the territorial extent of ma-
nageable copyright enforcement, at least for disputes that are liti-
gated, and which are the “mysterious mechanisms” that Peter 
Swire observed “are reducing the actual conflicts to a handful of 
cases.”224 The following sections discuss the litigation realities that 
concern choice of law and personal jurisdiction, and that affect 
plaintiffs’ strategies for claiming applicable law and choosing litiga-
tion fora; the realities also affect Internet actors’ level of com-
pliance with copyright laws on the Internet. 
A. Limitations on Choice of Applicable Law 
Notwithstanding the ubiquitous nature of most activities on the 
Internet, relatively few disputes advance to courts in which copy-
right owners claim copyright infringement in multiple countries 
and therefore raise infringement claims under the laws of multiple 
countries. There are several explanations for why choice-of-law 
issues are rare in copyright cases, including cases involving the In-
ternet, and why choice-of-law issues involving more than two coun-
tries are even rarer. 
Perhaps the most mundane reason for the low frequency of 
copyright cases that raise choice-of-law issues is that the issues do 
not seem to be recognized by many clients or their counsel. For 
clients, Ted De Boer’s observation is fitting that “the average citi-
zen, lacking experience in dealing with multistate legal problems, is 
not very sensitive to the problems and solutions of choice-of-law” 
and, as a result, “the problem as such escapes him.”225 We might 
expect better awareness from lawyers, who should be more cogni-
                                                                                                                            
224 Peter P. Swire, Elephants and Mice Revisited: Law and Choice of Law on the Internet, 
153 U. PA. L. REV. 1975, 1975 (2005). 
225 De Boer, supra note 180, at  298. 
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zant than the average citizen of the possibility that the laws of mul-
tiple countries could be implicated in a dispute; however, two im-
portant limitations exist. 
The first limitation is IP-specific and arises from the fact that IP 
law practice has traditionally not been viewed as prone to complex 
choice-of-law problems; the territoriality principle seemed to clear-
ly delineate the applicability of IP laws, leaving little if anything to 
choice-of-law analysis.226 Notwithstanding the fact that as early as 
1889 a conflict-of-laws expert authored a comprehensive study of 
conflict-of-laws issues in IP,227 and his work was not the only or the 
last to address the issues,228 courts and academics at the end of the 
twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century have noted 
the relative novelty and uniqueness of conflict-of-laws analyses fo-
cused on IP cases.229 
The second limitation that might explain why at least some 
lawyers are not particularly aware of choice-of-law issues in IP cas-
es, and therefore do not always recognize or utilize choice-of-law 
                                                                                                                            
226 See Paul Edward Geller, How To Practice Copyright Law Internationally in Perplexing 
Times?, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 167, 183–85 (2013) (discussing the need to “map 
out arguable infringement worldwide”). 
227 2 CARL LUDWIG VON BAR, THEORIE UND PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN 
PRIVATRECHTS 231–91 (1889). 
228 Examples of the twentieth century literature on the topic include ALOIS TROLLER, 
DAS INTERNATIONAL PRIVAT- UND ZIVILPROZEßRECHT IM GEWERBLICHEN RECHTSSCHUTZ 
UND URHEBERRECHT (Verlag für Recht und Gesellschaft, 1952); Alois Troller, 
Europäisierung des Patentrechts und Gerichtsstand, 1955 GRUR INT. 529; Friedrich Groß, 
Wie mache ich im Inland Ansprüche aus Schutzrechten geltend, deren Verletzung im Ausland 
erfolgt ist?, 1957 GRUR INT. 346; Otto-Friedrich Frhr. von Gamm, Die internationale und 
örtliche Zuständigkeit im gewerblichen Rechtsschutz, 50 MITTEILUNGEN DER DEUTSCHEN 
PATENTANWÄLTE 212 (1959); Heinz W. Auerswald, Können Ansprüche wegen Verletzung 
eines ausländischen Patents vor deutschen Gerichten verfolgt werden?, in FESTSCHRIFT 
WERNER VON STEIN 8 (1961); W. R. Cornish, Intellectual Property Infringement and Private 
International Law: Changing the Common Law Approach, 1996 GRUR INT. 285; Paul 
Edward Geller, Conflicts of Laws in Cyberspace: Rethinking International Copyright, 20 
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 571 (1996); JAMES J. FAWCETT, PAUL TORREMANS, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (1998); Ginsburg, supra 
note 38, at 239–406. 
229 “The rarity of coordinated studies of copyright and private international law is often 
deplored by legal writers representing both these disciplines.” STIG STRÖMHOLM, 
COPYRIGHT AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 3 (Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2010) “In spite of 
that oft complained scarcity of major contributions to the meeting of intellectual property 
and private international law, a complete study of modern legal writing on this topic 
would demand a very substantial chapter.” Id. at 60. 
2015] A MULTIPLICITY OF COPYRIGHT LAWS 393 
issues in copyright infringement cases, is the same limitation that 
exists in other areas of law and is associated with the general plight 
of conflict of laws as a subject in US law schools. Although globali-
zation generates more cross-border legal issues today than it ever 
has before, and conflict of laws should be one of the most impor-
tant tools in the toolbox of a modern lawyer,230 only about half of 
the US state bar associations test conflict of laws on their bar ex-
aminations; with few exceptions conflict of laws courses cover pri-
marily interstate and federal-state conflicts.231 Although courses on 
transnational litigation and comparative procedure are helpful addi-
tions to the traditional US conflict-of-laws curricula,232 the courses 
are too few to educate a sufficient percentage of future lawyers in 
the very important field and sensitize them to international issues 
and conflicts. A number of law schools now offer a course in inter-
national intellectual property law; however, only some of these 
courses cover conflict-of-laws problems in any significant detail.233 
                                                                                                                            
230 See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Public Law in the International Arena: Conflict of Laws, 
International Law, and Some Suggestions for Their Interaction (Hague Academy Lectures), 167 
RECUEIL DES COURS 311, 321 (1979) (“[T]he study of public international law and the 
study of private international law are not just two elements in a well balanced curriculum, 
comparable to anatomy and physiology for a medical student.”); Carolyn B. Lamm, 
Internationalization of the Practice of Law and Important Emerging Issues for Investor-State 
Arbitration: Opening Lecture, Private International Law Session  354 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 
25 (2011) (“The growing interdependence of legal systems has significantly increased the 
relevance of private international law and the need for lawyers to acquire international 
and comparative law skills.”). 
231 Friedrich Juenger cautioned in 1999: “The fact that our discipline has been 
preoccupied with domestic choice-of-law problems ought to be of some concern to law 
teachers, now that ‘globalization’ has become the cliché of choice and acronyms such as 
EU, NAFTA, and WTO are bantered about daily by the media.” Friedrich K. Juenger, 
The Need for A Comparative Approach to Choice-of-Law Problems, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1309–36 
(1999). 
232 Cyberlaw (or Internet Law) courses also tend to cover some jurisdictional issues. On 
the challenges of dealing with copyright cases involving multiple countries’ laws see 
Geller, supra note 226. 
233 PAUL GOLDSTEIN & MARKETA TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS, (3d ed. 2012); DANIEL C.K. CHOW & EDWARD LEE, 
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PROBLEMS, CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 
2012); GRAEME B. DINWOODIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
AND POLICY (2d ed. 2008). Conflict-of-laws issues are also covered to a lesser extent or in 
a cursory manner in MARGO A. BAGLEY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL PATENT LAW AND 
POLICY (2013); JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 
(3d ed. 2010); FREDERICK M. ABBOTT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
IN AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY (2d ed. 2007). 
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If neither lawyers nor their clients recognize a cross-border issue, 
they will not bring claims under foreign laws and the issue will not 
exist.234 
Even when a lawyer identifies a cross-border issue and informs 
the client about its existence and potential consequences, the law-
yer may advise against filing a case in a manner that would present 
a choice-of-law issue, or certainly in a manner that would result in 
the application of the laws of multiple countries, because litigating 
under the laws of multiple countries is challenging and expensive. 
Whether the rules of procedure require parties to plead and prove 
foreign law, invoke foreign law, submit foreign law for judicial no-
tice,235 or whether courts have an obligation to ascertain foreign law 
on their own,236 the inclusion of claims under multiple countries’ 
laws puts additional pressure on resources that the parties must 
expend in litigation. It is likely that parties will have to hire foreign 
law experts to analyze foreign law, and sometimes to present the 
law to the court. 
Another reason lawyers might pause before they file a case un-
der multiple countries’ laws is that courts have a natural hesitancy 
to apply the laws of multiple countries in one lawsuit. This hesitan-
cy is understandable; it can be sufficiently complex for a court to 
apply foreign law instead of forum law, and dealing with multiple 
countries’ laws in a single litigation complicates and prolongs the 
proceedings. Sometimes a court may wonder whether litigating 
under the laws of fewer countries would serve the plaintiff suffi-
                                                                                                                            
234 SOFIE GEEROMS, FOREIGN LAW IN CIVIL LITIGATION: A COMPARATIVE AND 
FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 41 (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 2004) (“Foreign law cannot get into 
court if neither the judge nor the parties suggest its relevance to the case at issue.”). Even 
if a court has an obligation to conduct a choice-of-law analysis on its own (which is the 
case in some jurisdictions) the court will not do so unless the parties raise claims that 
implicate a choice-of-law issue. See Carlos Esplugues, General Report on the Application of 
Foreign Law by Judicial and Non-Judicial Authorities in Europe, in APPLICATION OF 
FOREIGN LAW 18–22 (Carlos Esplugues, José Luis Iglesias & Guillermo Palao eds. 2011) 
(on the mandatory and non-mandatory character of choice-of-law rules). 
235 Geller, supra note 20, at 333 (“[T]he failure to plead the copyright law of each 
country impacted by the transactions at issue may preclude a claimant from relying on 
this law at a later stage of suit.”). 
236 On different approaches to foreign law in courts see, for example, De Boer, supra 
note 180, at 258–66; Esplugues, supra note 234, at 22–30; RICHARD FRIMPONG OPPONG, 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA 12–26 (2013); MARTIN 
WOLFF, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 218–23 (2d ed. 1950). 
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ciently, and whether the plaintiff is making claims under multiple 
countries’ laws to pursue indirect strategic goals. By bringing law-
suits under the copyright laws of too many countries, a lawyer may 
risk alienating the court from the outset.237 
The third reason for lawyers to limit the number of laws that 
they claim will apply to the case is that concentrating litigation un-
der the laws of multiple countries in one venue does not relieve the 
plaintiff of the responsibility to prove infringements in all countries 
where the plaintiff claims infringements to have occurred. The 
laws of most countries require the plaintiff to prove that the alleged 
acts were greater than de minimis infringements238 in order for a 
court to find the acts in violation of a country’s law, and unless the 
particular foreign country’s law provides for statutory damages 
that the adjudicating court would be willing to award,239 the plain-
tiff will also have to prove his lost profits and/or damages in the 
foreign country.240 
Whether a party brings a claim under multiple countries’ laws 
should depend on the result of a careful cost/benefit analysis. The 
cost analysis should consider not only litigation expenses241 but also 
strategic and reputational costs vis-à-vis the particular court, and—
given the recently increased public sensitivity to large-scale copy-
right enforcement efforts—also the costs to the image of the copy-
right owner and his public relations. For the benefit analysis the 
prediction of possible rewards242 should be tempered by an assess-
ment of potential difficulties that could be associated with the en-
forcement of the rewards, particularly if the enforcement might 
                                                                                                                            
237 If a plaintiff decides not to claim copyright infringement under the laws of foreign 
countries in a lawsuit, his decision should not mean that he waives any claims for 
infringements in the foreign countries. Not bringing a lawsuit under the law of a foreign 
country does not preclude the bringing of a separate (parallel or subsequent) lawsuit in 
the foreign country under that foreign country’s law. 
238 A “de minimis” infringement is “a technical violation of a right so trivial that the 
law will not impose legal consequences.” Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 
F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1997). 
239 See, e.g., Austin, supra note 100 (arguing that remedies should be governed by the 
laws of the country in which the infringement occurs). 
240 Some countries that do not provide for statutory damages have other alternatives to 
actual damages, but for these alternative damages some proof may also be necessary. 
241 Austin, supra note 7, at 590. 
242 Id. 
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require the recognition and enforcement of the resulting judgment 
in a foreign country outside the adjudicating court’s jurisdiction. 
Courts do not necessarily shy away from conflict-of-laws is-
sues; they address these issues regularly and from time to time also 
apply foreign law. However, courts generally prefer to apply forum 
law,243 the law with which they are most familiar; it is a natural 
tendency for courts to apply—whenever possible—choice-of-law 
rules in a manner that results in the courts applying forum law.244 
Courts, when faced with foreign law insufficiently invoked, 
pleaded, and/or proven will resort to applying the forum law under 
the presumption that the foreign law is identical to the forum 
law;245 in such a situation the outcome is identical to the outcome 
that would occur if the parties were to agree to have the forum law 
apply to their case—notwithstanding the fact that most countries’ 
laws do not permit parties to agree, post-infringement, on the law 
that will be applicable to their copyright infringement case.246 
                                                                                                                            
243 De Boer, supra note 180, at  391–93, 402–03; RICHARD FENTIMAN, FOREIGN LAW IN 
ENGLISH COURTS 24 (1998); Dinwoodie, supra note 2, at 530–31; Symeonides, supra note 
169, at 380 (noting that “[a]lmost two thirds of the [studied] cases  . . .  have applied the 
law of the forum state”). 
244 See CLIP PRINCIPLES, supra note 38, at art. 3:603 cmt. 3:603.C14 (“It is not 
unrealistic to submit that courts have a certain natural tendency to assume that the law 
having the closest connection to a case is the law of the forum.”); Austin, supra note 100, 
at 2 (“United States courts have employed a number of choice of law strategies to enable 
application of US copyright law to allegations of copyright infringement based on acts that 
have occurred abroad.”); Dinwoodie, supra note 2, at 533 (“[T]o the extent that US 
courts have been willing to localize an international dispute in a single country, they have 
invariably localized to the United States and thus have applied US law.”); Austin, supra 
note 213, at 112. On courts’ preference for forum law in general see, for example, 
Katherine Florey, State Law, U.S. Power, Foreign Disputes: Understanding the 
Extraterritorial Effects of State Law in the Wake of Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 92 
B.U. L. REV. 535, 556 (2012); Laura E. Little, Internet Defamation, Freedom of Expression, 
and the Lessons of Private International Law for the United States, 14 EUR. Y.B. OF PRIVATE 
INT’L LAW 1, 3 (2012) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2187449. 
245 See De Boer, supra note 180, at 313–16. The Reporter’s Note to the ALI Principles 
explains that “it may often be fair and reasonable for the court to presume that the 
relevant States’ norms are the same as those of the State whose law is chosen to apply” 
because of the “increasing harmonization of national intellectual property laws.” ALI 
PRINCIPLES, supra note 66, § 321. 
246 See ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: A COMPARATIVE 
TREATISE ON AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS LAW, INCLUDING THE LAW OF 
ADMIRALTY 181 (1967) (“American courts have, in innumerable cases, shown their 
willingness to accept the parties’ express or implied choice of the lex fori, whether that 
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When facing cases involving multiple countries’ laws, common law 
courts that apply the forum non conveniens doctrine may apply the 
doctrine to dismiss the case as better suited for another, more suit-
able forum.247 It is therefore not surprising that when plaintiffs 
have a choice of forum they tend to file infringement cases in the 
courts of the countries whose laws the plaintiffs want to apply; the 
practicalities thus promote the choice-of-law rule of lex loci protec-
tionis and the filing of cases in, and under the laws of, the countries 
where infringement is claimed. 
Unintentionally overlooking or intentionally avoiding a choice-
of-law issue that could lead to the application of the laws of mul-
tiple countries does not have to be detrimental to the client’s desire 
for redress; there are tools that help capture some or all of the acts 
in multiple countries. The doctrines of secondary infringement can 
cover acts that occur outside the protecting country; for example, 
instead of claiming that a defendant’s acts infringed the copyright 
law of a foreign country, a plaintiff may be able to claim that the 
acts induced infringement of copyright under US copyright law and 
as such also infringed US copyright law.248 While induced in-
fringements must occur in the United States, the associated acts of 
inducement can occur outside the United States and still be subject 
to US copyright law. Requesting profits arising from foreign acts 
that can be traced to an infringement in the United States is anoth-
er way that plaintiffs can obtain redress (even if not complete re-
dress) for acts occurring outside the United States while bringing 
the action only under US law.249 
                                                                                                                            
choice is made prior to or during litigation.”); see also supra note 202 and accompanying 
text on the Chinese and Swiss acts on private international law. 
247 See, e.g., Global Use/Territorial Rights, supra note 4, at 334 (noting that litigants in the 
United States may argue for dismissals for forum non conveniens if foreign law has to be 
interpreted); Austin, supra note 100 (analyzing forum non conveniens issues as they arise in 
cross-border copyright cases); FENTIMAN, supra note 243, at 24; Boosey & Hawkes Music 
Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481, 492 (2d Cir. 1998) (“While reluctance 
to apply foreign law is a valid factor favoring dismissal  . . .  standing alone it does not 
justify dismissal.”); see also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 260 (1981) 
(affirming previous Supreme Court jurisprudence that there is “a local interest in having 
localized controversies decided at home.”). 
248 See also Austin,  supra note 100, at 9. 
249 See supra notes 85–91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the possibility of 
receiving an award of foreign profits. 
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In many instances remedies obtained in a single country under 
that country’s law will provide as much redress as is feasible under 
the circumstances and serve the deterrence function. Annette Kur 
notes that decisions rendered by one court that apply a single coun-
try’s law “more often than not entail global effects, even where they 
only purport to pertain to the national territory.”250 Whether it is 
indeed “more often than not” is an empirical question worth its 
own study, but many decisions indeed have global effects. Injunc-
tions granted by courts applying even a single country’s law may 
stop acts worldwide, for example by ordering the takedown of a 
work from the Internet. Monetary damages can have global deter-
rence effects even if they are awarded for infringements in a single 
country; although such damages do not remedy harm caused in 
other countries, they might be sufficiently high to dissuade an in-
fringer from further similar acts and thus serve the deterrence 
function globally.251 To the extent that an infringer’s assets are li-
mited, damages awarded for infringement in one country, if they 
match or exceed the infringer’s assets, may entail all that (or more 
than) the plaintiff is realistically likely to recover. 
B. Limitations on Personal Jurisdiction 
The multiplicity problem is also mitigated by the fact that 
courts in at least some countries have limited specific jurisdiction 
over an Internet actor because courts have circumscribed personal 
jurisdiction based on acts committed on the Internet. Multiplicity 
critics have assumed that Internet actors would be exposed to mul-
tiple copyright laws in two scenarios: In the first scenario, a copy-
right owner would bring claims of copyright infringement under 
multiple copyright laws in the court of an Internet actor’s domicile 
(as long as the court considers the claims to be transitory causes of 
action it will entertain the action under foreign countries’ laws). 
This scenario would require that the court apply multiple copyright 
laws—a situation that is associated with the various limitations dis-
cussed in the previous section. In the second scenario, the copy-
                                                                                                                            
250 CLIP PRINCIPLES, supra note 38, §§ 320–21. 
251 The deterrence function might be served if the law provides for and the court awards 
punitive damages. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. However, even when a 
country’s law does not provide for punitive damages, the amount of compensatory 
damages might be sufficiently high to serve the deterrence function. 
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right owner would bring claims in all countries where the allegedly 
infringing work was accessible, and would bring the claims under 
all the respective copyright laws, thus utilizing the specific jurisdic-
tion that the courts in these countries would have based on the ac-
cessibility of the work, which accessibility would also make all the 
countries the places of the tortious activity. 
Many of the reasons for the low incidence of lawsuits that claim 
infringements under the laws of multiple countries (discussed in 
the previous section) are the same reasons for which the filing of 
lawsuits in multiple countries has not been rampant. Many clients 
might not even think of the possibility of filing in a foreign court, 
and lawyers might not see simultaneous filings in the courts of mul-
tiple countries as practical; few clients can afford to file in multiple 
countries or are willing to expend the resources necessary to liti-
gate in multiple countries.252 Not only do the costs of litigation in 
individual countries add up, but parties must allocate additional 
resources to the coordination of enforcement because litigation in 
various countries may require the same witnesses and evidence to 
be presented in each of the courts and in each language. 
Some courts have placed an important limitation on the specific 
jurisdiction for cases involving activities on the Internet by requir-
ing that the jurisdiction be based on a defendant’s actual contacts 
with the forum. That court jurisdiction would have to be limited for 
activities on the Internet in some manner has been clear since the 
beginnings of the Internet. In the United States, the Zippo test253 
placed a limit on jurisdiction based on activities of Internet web-
sites that were interactive; under the test, courts denied jurisdic-
tion in cases of websites that were purely passive. Although the test 
helped to limit jurisdiction, the limitation was insufficient because 
interactive websites remained exposed to the potential jurisdiction 
of courts worldwide.254 More recent approaches used in the United 
States seek to limit jurisdiction by requiring that a defendant have 
                                                                                                                            
252 Austin, supra note 100, at 5 (“The prospect of initiating parallel proceedings in each 
of the territories in which the infringements took place will likely prove prohibitive in 
many instances.”). 
253 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
254 Illinois v. Hemi Group LLC, 622 F.3d 754, 758–59 (7th Cir. 2010); Case C-585/08, 
Pammer v. Reederei Karl Schlüter GmbH & Co KG, 2010 E.C.R. I-12530 ¶ 79 (noting 
that the distinction between “interactive” and other websites “is not decisive”). 
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actual contacts with the forum;255 under these approaches the mere 
possibility of contacts—i.e. pure accessibility alone, even if com-
bined with interactivity—does not create personal jurisdiction.256 
Technological advancements assist Internet actors in limiting 
their exposure to the jurisdiction of foreign courts and the applica-
bility of foreign laws, if the actors are interested in limiting their 
exposure;257 geolocation and geoblocking technologies enable In-
ternet actors to delineate their activities on the Internet in a man-
ner consistent with countries’ physical boundaries by identifying 
Internet users’ physical locations and disabling the users’ access to 
the content if the Internet actors do not want the users connecting 
to the Internet from outside of particular countries to access the 
content. Of course technological advancements in geolocation and 
                                                                                                                            
255 Tracie E. Wandell, Geolocation and Jurisdiction: From Purposeful Availment to 
Avoidance and Trageting on the Internet, 16 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 275, 280–83 (2011). 
256 Teresa Scassa & Robert J. Currie, New First Principles? Assessing the Internet’s 
Challenges to Jurisdiction, 42 GEO. J. OF INT’L L. 1017, 1049 (2011) (“The fact that a 
website might be accessed by residents of one jurisdiction does not necessarily mean that 
it has been . . . .”); see also, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Yandex N.V., No. C 12–01521 WHA, 
2013 WL 4777189, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2013); Case C-585/08, Pammer v. Reederei 
Karl Schlüter GmbH & Co KG, 2010 E.C.R. I-12530 ¶ 64; Case C-173/11, Football 
Dataco Ltd. v. Sportradar GmbH, 2012 E.C.R. 1, ¶ 36 (examining these issues in the 
context of sui generis database protection); Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack (2014), 374 
D.L.R. 4th 1063 ¶ 36 (Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.) (“[T]he ability of someone in British Columbia 
to open a website created by a person in another country does not of itself give this Court 
jurisdiction over the creator of that website.”); Anderson, supra note 114, at 92–95 
(examining these issues through the lens of defamation); Laura E. Little, Internet 
Defamation, Freedom of Expression, and the Lessons of Private International Law for the 
United States, in 14 EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (2012). For 
an early prediction of this outcome see Goldsmith, supra note 31, at 1218 (“[T]here is 
relatively little reason at present, and even less reason in the near future, to believe that 
the mere introduction of information into cyberspace will by itself suffice for personal 
jurisdiction over the agent of the transmission in every state where the information 
appears.”). Cf. Case C-170/12, Pinckney v. KDG Mediatech AG, 2013 E.C.R. 400 ¶ 42 
(“Article 5(3) [of the Brussels I Regulation] does not require  . . .  that the activity 
concerned  . . .  be ‘directed to’ the Member State in which the court seised is situated.”); 
Case C-441/13, Hejduk v. EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH, 2014 E.C.R. ¶ 31, (opinion of 
AG Villalón). 
257 Goldsmith, supra note 31, at 1218–19 (“[F]iltering and identification technology 
promise greater control at less cost. In cyberspace as in real space, the ultimate meaning 
of ‘purposeful availment’ and ‘reasonableness’ will depend on the cost and feasibility of 
information flow control. As such control becomes more feasible and less costly, personal 
jurisdiction over cyberspace activities will become functionally identical to personal 
jurisdiction over real-space activities.”). 
2015] A MULTIPLICITY OF COPYRIGHT LAWS 401 
geoblocking are mirrored by advancements in virtual private net-
work technologies that enable Internet users to evade geolocation 
and avoid geoblocking, which undermines the effectiveness of geo-
location.258 However, installing bona fide and relatively effective 
geolocation and geoblocking technologies should help Internet ac-
tors protect themselves from the jurisdiction of courts located in 
geoblocked countries. 
A litigation cost/benefit analysis will lead many small copyright 
owners to sue in only one country (often in the country of their 
own domicile) so that they may enjoy the benefit of local counsel, 
litigation with familiar rules of procedure, and proceedings in their 
own language with a potentially sympathetic judge or a jury, and 
not have to fear bias in a foreign court against them as a foreign 
copyright owner.259 Copyright owners with more resources may 
opt to litigate where they can inflict the greatest pain on an alleged 
infringer, which will usually be in the place of the alleged infring-
er’s domicile.260 When the results of the limitations discussed in 
the previous section are combined with jurisdictional limitations it 
is unsurprising that many, if not most, Internet actors face litiga-
tion in only one of two places—the country of their own domicile 
or the country of the copyright owner’s domicile; in either place 
Internet actors typically face claims raised only under one copy-
right law—the copyright law of the forum. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Copyright enforcement on the Internet is challenging. Copy-
right owners face infringers located in different countries, with va-
rying laws being implicated by infringers’ acts and varying stan-
dards and practices of enforcement existing in the countries where 
the infringers are domiciled, the places where they act, and the 
places where their actions reach (where the content at issue can be 
viewed, downloaded, and/or streamed). Enforcement through In-
                                                                                                                            
258 See Trimble, supra note 1. 
259 Whether such bias exists is a different question; the parties’ concern that such bias 
exists or may exist is sufficient to impact the parties’ behavior. 
260 See Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Ainsworth, [2011] UKSC 39 (demonstrating that obtaining a 
default judgment in a court of specific jurisdiction with a plan to have the judgment 
enforced in the country of the defendant’s domicile might not be the best strategy). 
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ternet service providers who can take down allegedly infringing 
content may help copyright owners take swift enforcement action, 
but the takedown method is not without pitfalls, particularly in a 
cross-border context; for example, the law in the jurisdiction of the 
service provider’s domicile might not view the content as infring-
ing, and the filing of a request for a takedown with the service pro-
vider may prompt an alleged infringer to file a declaratory judg-
ment action in a jurisdiction that is foreign to the copyright own-
er.261 
A part of the copyright enforcement problem on the Internet is 
that countries continue to adhere to the principle of lex loci protec-
tionis for choice of law in copyright cases; the adherence means 
that a copyright owner facing a multi-country infringement of his 
copyright should file claims under the laws of all those multiple 
countries to obtain redress for the infringements in all those coun-
tries. Although theoretically a copyright owner can file a lawsuit 
under multiple copyright laws (either claims under all the coun-
tries’ laws simultaneously in the court of general jurisdiction, or 
claims under each country’s law in that country’s courts), practical 
limitations discussed in Part III constrain the copyright owner’s 
ability to do so. In most cases the copyright owner would probably 
select only one country or only a small number of countries in 
which and/or for which he would file his claims. The litigation con-
straints affect the copyright owner’s position in negotiations and in 
other extra-judicial enforcement efforts. 
The limitations that complicate enforcement for copyright 
owners, however, serve Internet actors well, including the Internet 
actors who strive to comply with the multiplicity of copyright laws 
on the Internet. Because of the inefficiencies caused by the myriad 
of conflict of laws rules and approaches that apply to activities on 
                                                                                                                            
261 Before filing a request with a foreign service provider, a copyright owner should 
consider whether he can and is willing to continue enforcement in a foreign court if the 
alleged infringer objects, and whether he can defend his copyright in a potential 
declaratory judgment suit that the alleged infringer could bring in a foreign jurisdiction if 
the copyright owner’s request creates a ground for personal jurisdiction over the owner in 
the foreign jurisdiction. See, e.g., Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 
1063 (10th Cir. 2008); see also Marketa Trimble, Setting Foot on Enemy Ground: Cease and 
Desist Letters, DMCA Notifications, and Personal Jurisdiction in Declaratory Judgment 
Actions, 50 IDEA 777 (2010). 
2015] A MULTIPLICITY OF COPYRIGHT LAWS 403 
the Internet, and because of the practical constraints on cross-
border enforcement, Internet actors enjoy some degree of certainty 
as to which laws will likely be held to govern their activities.262 Al-
though exceptions will exist, it is most likely, as the analysis in Part 
III suggests, that a copyright owner will sue an Internet actor either 
in the place of the Internet actor’s domicile or in the place of the 
copyright owner’s domicile, and that the copyright owner will 
claim infringement under the laws of one of the two countries, de-
pending on where he files suit. Narrowing the number of potential-
ly applicable copyright laws in most cases to two is not an insignifi-
cant achievement.263 
Discussions about the improvement of conflict-of-laws rules for 
IP cases should appreciate the fact that the inefficiencies resulting 
from the current myriad of conflict-of-laws rules and approaches 
fashion a somewhat workable system for Internet actors. Future 
proposals should improve enforcement but not lower the degree of 
legal certainty that Internet actors enjoy under the current ap-
proaches and rules. The existing conflict-of-laws proposals ana-
lyzed in Part II, if adopted, would help copyright owners in their 
cross-border enforcement efforts, and in circumstances involving 
ubiquitous infringement the proposals would enable worldwide en-
forcement of copyright in one action filed in a court of general ju-
risdiction under a single copyright law. The proposals would elimi-
nate most of the costs that copyright owners would otherwise incur 
because of the need to ascertain multiple foreign copyright laws, 
invoke and/or plead (and in some courts prove) multiple foreign 
laws, and engage legal experts for multiple countries. 
While making some aspects of enforcement easier, the existing 
proposals would not affect many of the practical limitations that 
were discussed in Part III. Although the proposals are already help-
ing to increase the awareness of IP lawyers of cross-border issues in 
copyright merely by making a wealth of information on the issues 
available, it may take time before lawyers and judges become com-
                                                                                                                            
262 That the certainty is not absolute but exists only as a degree of likelihood should not 
be surprising; frequently, “legal certainty” is no more than a lawyer’s best estimate of 
likelihood. 
263 The number of laws can be narrowed to two only if all countries’ laws identify the 
same person or entity as the copyright owner of a particular work. 
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fortable with claims of copyright infringements brought under mul-
tiple copyright laws. Copyright owners’ public relations costs may 
continue to be significant if owners opt for territorially large-scale 
enforcement strategies. Most importantly, even assuming the 
adoption of the existing proposals copyright owners would still 
have to prove infringements in all of the countries in which they 
claimed infringements had occurred—if not for the purposes of 
identifying the territorial scope of their claims, then for the deter-
mination of their remedies. Given that many of the practical limita-
tions would persist even if the proposals were adopted it seems 
likely that litigation would remain primarily in the same countries 
where cross-border copyright litigation tends to occur today and 
that courts would apply in the litigation the same countries’ copy-
right laws that they do today. 
Looking at the multiplicity problem from the point of view of 
Internet actors who want to be law abiding when acting on the In-
ternet, we also have to recognize that many Internet actors know 
little about the copyright laws of any particular country and make 
no attempts to learn about the laws. As they do with other legal is-
sues, many Internet actors rely on their best guess about what is 
permissible,264 and when they act on the Internet they assume (just 
as they do when they travel to foreign countries) that their best 
guess is equally applicable in all countries—perhaps with some 
awareness that minor differences among countries could exist. Of 
course best guesses are shaped by social norms which, as the Inter-
net proves, can depart from the law; the future will expose the du-
rability of the social norms that developed in the Wild West days of 
the Internet.265 
                                                                                                                            
264 Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 571 
(1992) (“Uninformed individuals act based on their best guess about how the law will 
apply to their contemplated conduct.”). 
265 According to a study, 84% of content accessed on the Internet by Spanish users is 
pirated. HÉCTOR JIMENEZ. BORJA MARTIN & IÑIGO PALAO, OBSERVATORIO DE PIRATERÍA 
Z HÁBITOS DE CONSUMO DE CONTENIDOS DIGITALES 2013, 17, available at 
http://lacoalicion.es/wp-content/uploads/Observatorio-pirater%C3%ADa-2013-
Ejecutivo.9-abril-2014.pdf. According to another study, “15% of the UK population has 
engaged in ‘illegal downloading.’” Joe Karaganis & Lennart Renkema, Copy Culture in the 
US & Germany, THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY 10 (2013), available at 
http://americanassembly.org/sites/default/files/download/publication/copy_culture.pd
f. 
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The existing proposals for conflict-of-laws rules for IP disputes 
and other ongoing initiatives in this area will contribute to aware-
ness in the legal community about cross-border issues as the issues 
arise in the context of IP enforcement, and will also provide an aca-
demic foundation for future national and international actions to 
improve cross-border enforcement of IP. The solutions that the 
proposals seek for infringements on the Internet (also referred to as 
ubiquitous infringements) might be the most difficult parts of the 
proposals and initiatives to propagate given that countries are cur-
rently adhering to the territoriality principle, and given that their 
interests lie in having their own laws applied to copyright infringe-
ments that occur in their territory. This Article suggests that some 
of the concerns that guide countries’ approaches to cross-border 
enforcement may be weakening, or at least be subject to debate. 
The proposals and initiatives should benefit from the continu-
ing development of technological and business solutions that can 
enhance both cross-border access to copyright-protected works and 
cross-border enforcement; some of the solutions could make the 
adoption of the proposals more palatable. Technological and mar-
ket solutions will continue to assist copyright owners in addressing 
the inefficiencies of enforcement and excesses in transaction 
costs.266 Geolocation, content ID (digital watermarks), and the ce-
lestial jukebox are among the tools and solutions that can facilitate 
easier cross-border transactions in copyright-protected materials. 
Technology could also lower litigation costs and make it feasible for 
more copyright owners to bring claims that arise in multiple coun-
tries in one court, and online access to legal resources and the pres-
entation of evidence in multiple countries will play an important 
role in the further internationalization of copyright litigation. 
                                                                                                                            
266 See Priest, supra note 32 (discussing examples of extra-legal enforcement measures 
facilitated by technological solutions and evolving business models). 
